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Why do certain self-defense cases—ones, e.g., involving battered women who kill 
their sleeping abusers, or beleaguered commuters who shoot panhandling minor-
ity teens—provoke intense political conflict? The conventional and seemingly 
obvious answer is that people judge such cases in a politically partisan fashion. 
This paper, however, suggests a subtler and more complex explanation. Social 
psychologists have shown that individuals resolve factual ambiguities in a man-
ner supportive of their defining values, both to minimize dissonance and to pro-
tect their connection to others who share their commitments. This form of self-
defensive cognition, it is submitted, shapes individuals’ perceptions of violent in-
teractions between parties seen to be complying with or defying contested social 
norms. As a result, even individuals who are trying to decide such cases based 
on honest and politically impartial assessments of the facts polarize along cul-
tural lines. The paper presents the results of an original empirical study (N = 
1,600) that supports this hypothesis. It also explores the normative significance 
of this account of the origins of political conflict over self-defense cases and how 
such conflict can be mitigated. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Self-defense cases can be as politically controversial as they are 
physically violent. Their conflict-provoking potential is reflected in 
two icons: the battered woman who shoots her abusive husband in 
the head as he sleeps, and the beleaguered urban commuter who 
opens fire on an African-American teenager who solicits him for 
cash.1 Behind these figures, however, stand broad, and continuously 
 
1 The cases, of course, are patterned on real (indeed, in the case of Bernard Goetz, 
infamous) ones. See George Fletcher, A Crime of Self-Defense: Bernhard Goetz 
and the Law on Trial (1990) (detailing facts and the controversy surrounding case 
of Bernard Goetz, beleaguered commuter acquitted of attempted murder of pan-
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1012967
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expanding, classes of disputed verdicts that variously move compet-
ing groups—conservatives and liberals, men and women, whites and 
minorities, straights and gays—to decry the partisan bias of the law.2 
 
handling African-American teens); State v. Norman, 78 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (de-
nying defense to battered woman who killed sleeping husband); State v. Leidholm, 
334 N.W.2d 811 (N.D. 1983) (permitting defense to be asserted by battered 
woman who killed sleeping husband). Scores of commentators have addressed the 
relationship between the defense claims asserted by defendants (real and hypo-
thetical) in cases presenting these basic facts. See, e.g., Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa-
Loquitur: of Reasonable Racists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 Stan. 
L. Rev. 781 (1994); Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making 
Sense, Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 211, 286-91 (2002); 
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 
96 Colum. L. Rev. 269, 327-33 (1996); Shirley Sagawa, A Hard Case for Feminists: 
People v. Goetz, 10 Harv. Women's L.J. 253 (1987). Perhaps the most fascinating 
exploration of the parallel structure of the defenses in these two iconic cases is 
presented by Mark Kelman, in Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, in Questions of 
Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines (J. Chandler, A. I. 
Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994). As we’ll explain, although we propose a 
different solution, the puzzle that Kelman identifies—why do people who clearly 
experience different ideological responses to these cases join issue on disputed 
facts—furnishes the central motivation for our study.  
2 One need only pick up (or click on) the newspaper, for controversial cases. See, 
e.g., Anemona Hartocollis, Four Women Are Convicted In Attack on Man in Village, 
N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 2007, at B3 (“The trial attracted attention because both sides, 
though in opposite ways, framed the case as a bias attack involving lesbians and a 
straight man.”); Janine Anderson, Man Guilty in Shooting Death of Teen, Wisconsin 
State Journal (Madison, Wisc.), Nov. 14, 2006, at B3 (“The case divided Racine, 
with some people saying White was a vigilante. Others thought it was his right to 
stand up to crime in his neighborhood. . . . ‘It was a all-white jury. He’s a black 
man," [his sister] said. ‘If Adrian was a white man, he wouldn't be in this situa-
tion.’ ”); Reva Mceachern, Young, Black, Lesbian . . . and Always on Guard, Star Ledger 
(Newark, N.J.), May 14, 2007, at 15 (“By portraying the Newark women, who were 
convicted last month of second-degree gang assault, as ‘avowed lesbians’ and a 
‘seething Sapphic septet,’ [local newspaper] writers shed light on their own preju-
dices and made a mockery of men attacking lesbian women.”); Robert McFadden, 
Verdict Bares Sharp Feelings on Both Sides, N.Y. Times, Feb. 26, 2000, at A1 (“Strong 
and deeply polarized emotions—anger, bitter indignation and stunned disbelief on 
one side, and expressions of relief and vindication on the other—rippled across the 
metropolitan area last night as politicians, community leaders and ordinary New 
Yorkers reacted swiftly to the acquittal of four white police officers in the killing of 
an unarmed black immigrant . . . .”); Mistrial Declared in Castration Case, L.A. Times, 
Feb. 10, 1995, at B10 (reporting controversial case involving attack on sleeping 
husband alleged to have abused wife). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 4 
  
                                                
Contestation of this sort is disheartening. The contours of self-
defense doctrine express the extreme value that the law attaches to 
human life and the dedication of the law to protecting the lives of all 
citizens regardless of social identity or moral outlook. Recurring po-
litical controversy not only confronts us with evidence that individual 
juries might sometimes be insufficiently dedicated to these values; it 
gives us reason to wonder how sincerely committed to these values 
all of us really are. If we are constantly falling into factional dispute 
about such decisions—one day applauding a verdict our adversaries 
denounce and the next day denouncing what they applaud—then ei-
ther some large segment of our society is consistently rejecting the prin-
ciples that inform the law or, more likely, we are all selectively rejecting 
them when we find their dictates unappealing. When push literally 
and lethally comes to shove, we all give in to the temptation to place 
our parochial attachments ahead of the universal values embodied in 
the law. 
Or do we? Our aim in this paper is to suggest a more subtle and 
complex explanation of political conflict over self-defense. The ac-
count we propose does in fact acquit jurors, and the rest of us, of the 
charge of infidelity to the values embodied in the law. But it does so 
at a cost: the exposure of a threat to realization of the law’s ends that 
is arguably even more troubling—because less amendable to detec-
tion and therefore to correction—than rank parochialism. The source 
of political contestation over self-defense, we will argue, are a set of 
related constraints on human cognition. 
Known as “defensive bias” or “identity-protective cognition,” 
one of these constraints refers to the tendency of individuals to form 
factual beliefs that affirm their defining values. It’s reassuring to be-
lieve that behavior one admires is beneficial to society, and behavior 
one finds offensive detrimental; it’s disquieting to contemplate that 
the opposite might be true, particularly when such beliefs threaten to 
put one at odds with persons whose character one respects and 
whose good opinion one covets. For these reasons, it’s natural for 
individuals subconsciously to resist evidence that challenges factual 
beliefs supportive of their values, particularly when those beliefs are 
widely held within groups with which they identify.3 This dynamic 
 
3 See generally Geoffrey L. Cohen, David K. Sherman, Anthony Bastardi, Lillian Hsu 
& Michelle McGoey, Bridging the Partisan Divide: Self-Affirmation Reduces Ideological 
Closed-Mindedness and Inflexibility in Negotiation, J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. (forth-
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has been shown to be the source of intense political conflict over di-
verse factual issues, from the causes of global warming to the safety 
of guns, from the deterrent effect of the death penalty to the efficacy 
of vaccinating young girls for HPV.4 
We contend that the same mechanism generates political con-
troversy over self-defense cases. As the iconic cases of the battered 
woman and beleaguered commuter illustrate, deadly confrontations 
can interact with contested group norms—ones relating to who 
should be afforded respect and deference by whom, and what sorts 
of behavior are appropriate for persons occupying different roles. 
Where that happens, jurors who decide self-defense cases, and citi-
zens who react to what juries decide, are impelled by a form of psychic 
self-defense to form a view of the facts that affirms their groups’ norms. 
These citizens aren’t ignoring facts that denigrate their group commit-
ments; rather they are deriving the facts from their commitments. As a 
result, citizens end up culturally polarized about the outcomes of 
such cases despite their good-faith intentions to judge them in an 
nonpartisan fashion.  
To support this view, we present the results of an original ex-
perimental study. That study, which involved a diverse sample of 
some 1,600 Americans, strongly supports the conclusion that political 
disputes over self-defense cases arise from self-defensive cognition of 
the type we posit. 
The obvious question posed by these findings is, What to do? 
One answer, of course, would be, Nothing. Perhaps nothing can be 
done. More important, perhaps there’s no reason to do anything any-
way: since the operation of self-defensive cognition is perfectly con-
sistent with good-faith efforts on the part of decisionmakers to be 
 
coming 2007) [hereinafter “Cohen, et al. Partisan Divide”]; G. L. Cohen, J. Aronson 
& C. M. Steele, When Beliefs Yield to Evidence: Reducing Biased Evaluation by Affirming the 
Self, 26 Personality & Social Psychol. Bull. 1151 (2000) [hereinafter “Cohen, et al., 
Affirming the Self”]; Roger Giner-Sorolla & Shelly Chaiken, Selective Use of Heuristic 
and Systematic Processing Under Defense Motivation, 23 Personality & Soc. Psychol. Bull. 
84 (1997). 
4 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. 
Mertz, Culture and Identity Protective Cognition: Explaining the White-Male Effect in Risk 
Perception, 4 J. Empirical Legal Stud. 465 (2007); Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: 
The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc. 
Psychol. 808 (2003); Cultural Cognition Project, Second National Risk and Culture 
Study (Sept. 27, 2007), available at, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017189. 
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impartial, perhaps there’s nothing morally problematic about judg-
ments that reflect this influence. The discovery that self-defensive 
cognition is at work, it might be thought, dispels the anxiety that po-
litical controversy over self-defense cases is anything to fret about. 
But we don’t take this position. The contribution that self-
defensive cognition makes to reactions to putative instances of self-
defense, we believe, is a manifestation of another constraint on cog-
nition that interferes with individuals’ power of moral reasoning. Cog-
nitive illiberalism refers to psychological tendency to impute harmful 
consequences (or to deny the same) to behavior that offends (or 
gratifies) one’s cultural norms.5 This condition subverts the ends of 
persons—we think the vast majority of citizens in American soci-
ety—who genuinely believe the law should not be used to impose a 
cultural orthodoxy, even if the values being forced on others are their 
own.  
Treating these condition as they afflict judgments in self-defense 
cases is no easy task. The effects of self-defensive cognition can’t be 
counteracted through admonitions to be “fair minded” and “nonpar-
tisan.” Citizens laboring under the influence of this form of subcon-
scious cognitive motivation already are doing their best to be impar-
tial.  
Indeed, moralizing exhortations likely just make things worse. 
The phenomena of identity-protective cognition and cognitive illiber-
alism are related to—and indeed interact in a self-reinforcing way 
with—another psychological mechanism known as “naïve realism.”6 
Naïve realism consists in the tendency of persons to recognize the 
influence of group values on the factual perceptions of persons with 
whom they disagree while being oblivious to the like influence of 
their own values on their own beliefs. A deliberative environment in 
which citizens admonish their opponents to be “fair and reasonable,” 
then, predictably breeds reciprocal, self-righteous charges of “bias”—
thereby magnifying the conviction of culturally aligned groups that 
their opposites are either morally bankrupt, profoundly stupid, or 
 
5 See generally, Dan M. Kahan, The Cognitively Illiberal State, 60 Stan. L. Rev. (forth-
coming 2007), available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=963929. 
6 See generally Robert J. Robinson, Dachter Keltner, Andrew Ward & Lee Ross, 
Actual Versus Assumed Differences in Construal: "Naive Realism" in Intergroup Perception 
and Conflict, 68 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 404 (1995). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 7 
  
                                                
both. This common apprehension transforms seemingly “factual” 
policy disputes into occasions for illiberal forms of cultural conflict, 
making it even more likely that individuals will react with self-
defensive skepticism to views of facts that differ from their own.7 
This dynamic, though, does suggest one modest intervention 
that citizens of good faith could take to ameliorate political divisions 
over self-defense. It is that they stop decrying the bias of the law when 
they see verdicts with which they disagree, and stop accusing their cul-
tural opposites of the same bad-faith for forming impressions of 
those verdicts with which they disagree. Instead, they should openly 
recognize what is in fact true—that nearly all of us are honestly trying 
to be fair, yet we all labor under the constraints of self-defensive cog-
nition. An environment in which citizens of diverse commitments 
reacted this way to inevitably disappointing verdicts would itself go a 
good way to dissipating the disheartening perception that none of us 
is fairly committed to the values embodied in self-defense law. And it 
is also a condition of more concrete institutional steps that might be 
taken to counteract the influence of self-defensive cognition on the 
law. 
We will present this account in three parts. By way of back-
ground, Part I examines the animating rationale of self-defense doc-
trine, and its relationship to decisionmakers’ moral and psychological 
dispositions. Part II will describe and report the results of the ex-
perimental study we conducted to test the hypothesis that self-
defensive cognition pervades the evaluation of controversial instances 
of asserted self-defense. And Part III will explain the distinctive na-
ture of the problem this condition presents, and identify steps that 
might be taken to counteract it. 
I. DOCTRINAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
We propose to test the claim that political conflict over self-
defense verdicts derives from the psychic stake that individuals have 
in forming factual judgments that affirm their group commitments. 
To make the nature of this claim more concrete, we start with an 
overview of the principles—doctrinal and normative—of self-
defense law and then relate these to models of how group affiliations, 
 
7 See Kahan, supra note 5. 
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values, and factual perceptions can interact with one another in the 
application of the doctrine. 
A. Self-Defense: The Doctrine and Its Precarious Rationale 
The standard formulation of self-defense in America law is both 
straightforward and concise. In essentially all jurisdictions, a person 
who has not otherwise provoked aggression is entitled to resort to 
deadly force against another (and hence is protected from criminal 
liability for doing so) when she honestly and reasonably believes that 
deadly force is necessary to prevent an imminent threat of death or great 
bodily harm to himself.8 
What is the rationale of the doctrine? Conventionally, theorists 
divide criminal law defenses into “justifications” and “excuses.” The 
former protect a person from liability where breaking a law generates 
a state of affairs that is more desirable (along some utilitarian or wel-
farist metric) than would complying with it. The latter protect a per-
son from liability for a crime, regardless of how undesirable the con-
sequences, where that person is nevertheless morally blameless (usu-
ally, it is said, as a result of impaired volition).9 
Self-defense doctrine can be rationalized along either of these 
lines. The doctrine can be characterized as a “justification,” for ex-
ample, on the ground that where it reasonably appears a choice must 
be made between the lives of an aggressor and a nonagressor the law 
prefers survival of the former.10 Or, if one is averse to taking a posi-
tion on the relative value of lives, authorizing the use of deadly force 
to repel a deadly attack can be defended as promoting a greater num-
ber of lives on net—the desired state of affairs, in justification 
terms—by furnishing an incentive to aggressively disposed actors not 
to engage in deadly attacks in the first place.11  
 
8 See 2 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 10.4(b) (2d ed. 2003). If the 
threat is of some less magnitude, a person may repel it with only with nonlethal 
force. See id.  
9 See generally J.L. Austin, A Plea for Excuses, 57 Proc. Aristotelian Soc’y 1 (1956-
1957); Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Prerequisite 
for Criminal Liability, 23 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 266, 274 75 (1975) 
10 See, e.g., George Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 857-59 (1978). 
11 See, e.g., Glanville Williams, The Theory of Excuses, 1982 Crim. L. Rev. 732, 739. 
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Alternatively, if one focuses on the likely volition-impairing im-
pact of the circumstances in which the doctrine permits resort to 
deadly force, one can also see self-defense as an “excuse.” On this 
account, the “primal impulse of self-preservation”12 triggered by the 
prospect of an impending deadly attack is said to destroy one’s capac-
ity to control the urge to resort to protective violence and to disrupt 
reasoned contemplation of alternatives.13 In the same spirit of forgiv-
ing impaired volition, the basis for admitting expert testimony on 
Battered Woman Syndrome and like conditions is that the standard 
of “reasonableness” used to judge a defender’s beliefs in the need to 
resort to force should be sensitive to excusable defects in perception 
or will.14  
But it turns out that one can fairly easily recast these excuse-
based rationales in justification terms. If a person perceives (by virtue 
of genuine or imagined exigency) that she faces an act of deadly ag-
gression, then no threatened punishment can possibly deter her from 
resorting to deadly self-defense.15 Because punishment will make the 
defender suffer and deplete societal resources to no avail, affording 
her a complete defense instead generates a better state of affairs all 
things considered.16 
 
12 State v. Norman, 378 S.E.2d 8, 12 13 (N.C. 1989); see also United States v. Peter-
son, 483 F.2d 1222, 1229 30 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (self-defense is “[h]inged on the exi-
gencies of self-preservation” where the defender believed that “his response was 
necessary to save himself” from imminent peril of death or serious bodily harm). 
13 See Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 345 46 (Penguin Classics 1985) (1651) ( “If a 
man by the terrour of present death, be compelled to doe a fact against the Law, he 
is totally Excused; because no Law can oblige a man to abandon his own preserva-
tion. . . . Nature . . . compels him to the fact.”); see also 3 William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England *3-4 (1765-69) (“For the law . . . respects 
the passions of the human mind . . . and . . . when external violence is offered . . . 
makes it lawful to do himself that immediate justice, to which he is prompted by 
nature, and which no prudential motives are strong enough to restrain.”). 
14 See, e.g., Kathryn Jo Rosen, The Excuse of Self-Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident 
on Behalf of Battered Women Who Kill, 36 Am. U. L. Rev. 11 (1986). 
15 See Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 47 (Dover 1991) (1881) (“[T]he 
law cannot prevent [use of deadly force in self-defense] by punishment, because a 
threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to 
make a man choose death now in order to avoid the threat.”). 
16 See, e.g., Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: II--Honest but Unreasonable Mis-
take of Fact in Self Defense, 28 B.C. L. Rev. 459, 501-02 (1987). 
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In virtue of the plasticity of the “justification” and “excuse” 
framework,17 it is more edifying to add to the analysis some consid-
eration of the historical and political context surrounding American 
self-defense law. From this perspective, the expansive range of cir-
cumstances in which the doctrine does not warrant resort to deadly 
force furnish more insight into its rationale than the relatively con-
fined ones in which it does. 
The conventional formulation effectively permits the use of 
deadly force only to protect one’s life. But one could easily imagine a 
doctrine that authorized the use of deadly force when necessary to 
protect myriad other interests—property, honor, autonomy, equality, 
and the like. This would still be a doctrine of self-defense, moreover, 
in any society that understood recognition of a person’s moral agency 
to demand respect not just for his bodily integrity but for his domin-
ion over property, his entitlement to social deference, his enjoyment 
of individual liberty, and so on. 
The conventional formulation also addresses persons in univer-
sal terms, supplying a unitary standard that makes no reference to the 
social identities of the persons entitled to use deadly force or those 
against whom they are entitled to use it. Here too one could easily 
imagine things being different. The doctrine, for example, could au-
thorize deadly force to be employed to protect against nondeadly 
threats (to the body, property, or status of the defender) when posed 
by certain lower types of persons to higher ranking ones. Or it could 
deny persons of the lower rank the authority to use deadly force even 
to repel deadly threats when posed by persons of the higher rank. 
One reason it’s easy to imagine a doctrine of this sort is that in 
fact it actually existed for centuries. Tolerance of the use of deadly 
force to protect nonvital interests—particularly incidences of status, 
such as displays of deference in public space and male dominion over 
the sexual lives of wives and daughters—was a conspicuous character-
istic of societies guided by honor norms.18 Historically, feudal and 
 
17 See generally Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and Excuse, 84 
Colum. L. Rev. 1897 (1984). 
18 See generally Richard E. Nisbett & Dov Cohen, Culture of Honor: The Psychol-
ogy of Violence in the South (1996). 19 See generally David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant & 
Joanne D. Eisen, The Human Right of Self-Defense, BYU J. Pub. L. (forthcoming 
2007). 
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sectarian social orders did condition the privilege to use deadly force 
on persons’ group identities in a manner reflective of the differential 
value of persons of different classes.19 The law in antebellum Ameri-
can South did, too, denying Blacks the authority to use deadly force 
to protect themselves from deadly assaults by whites and affording 
whites greater authority to use deadly force against Blacks than 
against fellow whites.20 
Contemporary American self-defense doctrine can be under-
stood as embodying a distinctively humanist21 repudiation of the 
moral understandings that inform these alternative honor-or status-
protective self-defense regimes. The self-conscious refusal of con-
temporary doctrine to license deadly force to protect nonvital af-
fronts, not only to one’s person but even more significantly to pre-
rogatives conspicuously associated with honor and status (e.g., the 
seduction of a man’s wife or daughter) expresses the “supreme value 
of human life” recognized by “[a]ny civilized system of law.”22  
 
20 See, e.g., A. Leon Higginbotham & Anne F. Jacobs, The Law Only as an Enemy: 
The Legitimization of Racial Powerlessness Through the Colonial and Antebellum 
Criminal Laws of Virginia, 70 N.C.L. Rev. 969, 1029 (1992) (“Despite the unrelent-
ing punishments and beatings that a slave might receive at the hands of an over-
seer, an owner, or another white, there were only rare instances in which a slave 
might claim self-defense in the killing of a white person. Such cases generally in-
volved whites of low socioeconomic background.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 
279, 329 & n.8 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that “[d]uring the colonial 
period, black slaves who killed whites in Georgia, regardless of whether in self-
defense or in defense of another, were automatically executed” but that “a person 
who willfully murdered a slave was not punished until the second offense, and then 
was responsible simply for restitution to the slave owner”) (citing A. Leon Higgen-
botham, In the Matter of Color: Race in the American Legal Process (1978)).  
21 We do not appeal to any fully theorized conception of this term, but use it only 
to signify a basic moral orientation that treats satisfaction of the needs and interests 
of human beings as the paramount normative good, and that denies that entitle-
ment of individuals to have their needs and interests satisfied should turn on their 
social status or identity or on their adherence to any particular cultural, religious, or 
moral orthodoxy.  
22 State v. Nodine, 259 P.2d 1056, 1071 (Or. 1953) (holding that deadly force may 
not be used to prevent a man from cohabitating and having sexual relations with 
the minor daughter of another); see also State v. Clay, 256 S.E.2d 176, 182 (N.C. 
1979) (conventional formulation of self-defense “precludes the use of deadly force 
to prevent . . . offensive physical contact and in so doing recognizes the premium 
we place on human life”). 
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Contemporary doctrine, moreover, attaches such value to all 
persons’ lives, regardless of their social identity or their adherence to 
any orthodox moral code. This humanist commitment is reflected 
not only in the formal universality of the language of the doctrine. It 
is expressed too by the “objective reasonableness” requirement. In 
subjecting the defender’s perceptions to searching ex post review, the 
law, remarkably, imposes a duty on the defender to take care not to ex-
tinguish the wrongful aggressor’s life needlessly. By refusing to make 
the admitted aggressor alone bear the risk of mistake, this feature of 
the doctrine expresses the message that even the lives of bad persons 
have “extreme value” in the eyes of the law. 
This account, it’s true, must confront a variety of widely ob-
served modifications of the doctrine that challenge its humanist pre-
tensions. In some jurisdictions, for example, individuals can resort to 
deadly violence not only to repel lethal physical attacks but also to 
avert certain crimes, such as “kidnapping, forcible rape, forcible 
criminal sexual act[s] or robbery.”23 In many others, individuals can 
use deadly force to repel a deadly attack in a public space even when 
they could safely have retreated,24 and in even more jurisdictions they 
can use deadly force to repel a deadly attack within their residence 
regardless of the feasibility of escape.25 Because they seem to permit 
resort to deadly force when the alternative is apparently not death but 
rather an experience of profound subjugation or humiliation, these 
qualifications of the doctrine seem to bear the signature of the older, 
honor-based alternative.26 
 
23 N.Y. Penal Law s 35.15; see also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. s 627:4(II)(b)(c) (“unlawful 
force against a person present while committing or attempting to commit a bur-
glary,” “kidnapping or a forcible sex offense”); Tex. Penal Code Ann. s 9.32 (“ag-
gravated kidnapping, . . . sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery, or ag-
gravated robbery”). Most jurisdictions, in contrast, permit deadly force to be used 
to prevent a felony only if the felony is “forcible and atrocious,” a designation that 
requires a factual finding that the felony posed a danger of death or great bodily 
harm. See generally LaFave, supra note 8, .§ 10.7(c). Because an individual would be 
permitted to use deadly force under for self-defense in such circumstances, this 
position affords no special exemption from criminal liability when a person uses 
deadly force to prevent a felony. See id. 
24 See LaFave, supra note 8, .§ 10.4(f). 
25 See id. 
26 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 329-30. 
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But the law (through those who expound it) is at pains to deny 
that this is so. The tolerance of deadly force to avoid certain crimes, 
for example, can be defended on the ground that the enumerated of-
fenses present a risk of death sufficiently high in general to justify a 
presumption in all cases that deadly force to repel them is necessary 
to protect their intended victims’ lives.27 Dispensing with any duty to 
retreat can be attributed to the volition-destroying impact that threat-
ened deadly assaults have on defenders: “detached reflection cannot 
be demanded in the presence of an uplifted knife,”28 after all. When 
such an assault occurs in the close confines of person’s residence, as 
opposed to the public square, both the statistical probability of dan-
ger and the reason-disrupting impact of fear converge to justify re-
lieving her of the obligation to retreat.29 
Critical commentators have shown the fragility of the assump-
tions underlying these rationalizations.30 But in exactly the way that 
hypocrisy pays homage to virtue, the very energy with which those 
who expound the law are moved to rationalize away, rather than ac-
knowledge, these departures from the humanist principles of conven-
tional self-defense doctrine is a tribute to the shared professional and 
cultural understanding that these principles ought to be normative for 
our law.  
Of course, rationalizations of these troublesome qualifications of 
the conventional doctrine are also an acknowledgement that those 
who are governed by contemporary self-defense law have not com-
pletely liberated themselves from the sensibilities that guided its 
 
27 See 2 Paul Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses § 131(d) (1998) (“[E]numerated-
felonies provisions that govern the justification of deadly force . . . commonly list 
felonies . . . that by their nature involve the potential for violence to the defen-
dant.”)28 Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (Holmes, J.). 
29 See, e.g., State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 901, 903-04 (Minn. 1999) (reason-
ing that one has no duty to retreat before using deadly force to prevent a felony in 
the home because actor in that situation will invariably experience reasonable sense 
of great danger); Richard A. Posner, Killing or Wounding to Protect a Property Interest, 14 
J.L. & Econ. 201, 204 (1971) (making same argument). 
30 See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Criminal Law: The Case for a Criminal 
Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1181, 1217-19 (1994); Kahan & 
Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 329-30; Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 
113 Harv. L. Rev. 413, 430-31 (1999). 
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honor-based predecessor. We do remain tempted to regard some im-
portant dignitary ends (honor, equality, autonomy, and the like) as 
worthy of protection even at the expense of the lives of those who 
threaten them. We understandably remain tempted to view the lives 
of those who threaten those interests as worth less than those of per-
sons who live virtuous lives. And, as individuals who continue to de-
fine our identities with reference to certain intensely held group 
commitments, we no doubt remain vulnerable, in a way that can be 
expected to influence our assessment of self-defense cases, to differ-
entially valuing the lives of those who do and don’t share those affini-
ties.31 
In this sense, the rationale of the contemporary self-defense 
doctrine obviously isn’t so much a passive reflection of what con-
temporary American values are as it is a considered articulation of 
what we believe our societal values should be. And in that sense, too, 
when we judge the appropriateness of a deadly confrontation be-
tween citizens—particularly ones who are behaving in ways that defy 
norms integral to our defining group commitments—the doctrine 
tests our capacity to live by the best understanding we have of our-
selves. 
B. Evaluating Self-Defense Evidence: Three Models 
Self-defense doctrine, we’ve suggested, constrains not just indi-
viduals engaged in violent confrontations but also those who judge 
those individuals. In particular, it enjoins the judgers—legal deci-
sionmakers, certainly, but the rest of us, too, to the extent that it rests 
on morally sound precepts—to set aside partisan values, particularly 
ones born of parochial group attachments, and evaluate the facts 
based on humanist criteria that attach supreme value to the life of all 
persons, regardless of social identity. That constraining function 
makes certain assumptions about how values founded on group 
commitments, perceptions of the facts, and judgments about the ap-
propriateness of self-defense relate to one another. We now consider 
three simple decisionmaking models—one in which these phenom-
ena interact in the way self-defense doctrine demands, one in which 
 
31 Cf. Randall Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme 
Court, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1388, 1441-42 (1988) (concluding that such affinities influ-
ence disposition of jurors to impose death penalty).  
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they clearly don’t, and another in which whether they do or not is 
open to significant debate. 
1. Neutral Umpire 
The first model can be called the “Neutral Umpire” position. 
On this account, individuals base their judgments of the appropriate-
ness of lethal self-defense entirely on their perceptions of the facts 
that the doctrine, consistent with its rationale, identifies as disposi-
tive. Their parochial moral and cultural commitments play no role in 
their appraisals. This is the form of decisionmaking that the doctrine 
demands for realization of its humanist aspirations. 
Result
Fact
Perceptions
Partisan
Values
 
Figure 1. Neutral Umpire Model 
It’s worth noting that nothing in the Neutral Umpire Model im-
plies that judgments about outcomes in self-defense (or other types 
of) cases will or should be uniform across individuals. People will 
obviously disagree under this model whenever they differ about what 
the facts are. Moreover, it should be perfectly obvious that people of 
different backgrounds are likely to disagree about doctrinally relevant 
facts (most of which, such as the intentions of the parties, or what 
the consequences of refraining from deadly force would have been, 
cannot be directly observed) because of the varying impact that di-
verse experiences have on how they interpret bits and pieces of am-
biguous evidence. What matters under the Neutral Umpire Model (or 
at least any conception of it that is even minimally susceptible of im-
plementation) is only that individuals base their decisions on their 
honest view of the facts, even when that produces outcomes that dis-
appoint their partisan values. 
2. Political Partisanship 
Next is the “Political Partisanship Model.” This is a decision-
making style that subverts the doctrine’s aspirations. In it, evaluators 
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judge the appropriateness of self-defense based entirely on their par-
tisan values. They approve or disapprove of the use of lethal force 
based on group-based commitments that determine both the value 
they attach to human life in relative to other nonvital interests and 
the comparative value they attach to the lives of particular persons. 
They simply ignore the facts that the law deems dispositive if those 
facts generate a result that their partisan values disapprove of. 
Result
Fact
Perceptions
Partisan
Values
 
Figure 2. Political Partisanship Model 
Diverse groups of commentators perceive this model of deici-
sionmaking to be endemic. The most prominent version of this posi-
tion is the “abuse excuse” critique, which takes aim at expert psychi-
atric testimony in cases involving battered women and other defen-
dants exposed to chronic abuse or social privation.32 Such testimony, 
the critics argue, rests on junk science and, more importantly, is in-
compatible with the premise of “individual responsibility” that has 
historically informed American criminal law. Decisionmakers’ recep-
tivity to such evidence, they maintain, is fueled by a form of “political 
correctness” that moves decisionmakers to express support for 
members of historically oppressed by excusing their use of violence 
against members of groups that have tradionally tormented them.33 
But “forsaking objective law in favor of shared group feelings,”34 
warn the critics, is a dangerous move. “Such group[-]thought once 
led white jurors to acquit whites who had killed blacks . . . and to 
convict blacks who may or may not have killed whites, whatever the 
                                                 
32 See, e.g., Alan M. Dershowitz, The Abuse Excuse: and Other Cop-outs, Sob stories, and 
Evasions of Responsibility (1994); Charles J. Sykes, A Nation of Victims: the Decay of 
the American Character (1992); James Q. Wilson, Moral Judgment : Does the 
Abuse Excuse Threaten Our Legal System? (1997). 
33 See Sykes, supra note 32, at 144-49; Dershowitz, supra note 32, at 3-42. 
34 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111. 
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oman. 
prive them of.37  
                                                
evidence.35 The beleaguered commuter, it is implied, is the un-
planned progeny of the battered w
Other scholars have critiqued the “abuse excuse” critique in 
turn. Styled the “new normativity” by Victoria Nourse,36 this posi-
tion denies the premise that criminal law has ever genuinely been 
guided by a principle of individual responsibility uninformed by cul-
turally partisan values. Courts and juries historically exonerated—
whether by self-defense, insanity, or provocation—the cuckold who 
killed his unfaithful wife or her lover, the father who slew the “rav-
ager” of his unmarried daughter, and the “true man” who stood his 
ground rather than flee the site of a deadly altercation. When they did 
so, they invariably cited generalizations about conditions that “unseat 
reason” and “disable self-control”—ones certainly no more well 
grounded in scientific data than the battered woman syndrome. But 
much more critical than the wholly unperceivable intensity of exoner-
ated offenders’ passions, New Normativists argue, was the manifest 
moral quality of them. Offenders were relieved from liability when 
(and only when) their fear, rage, or disgust revealed an appropriate 
commitment to goods (honor, patriarchal sovereignty, autonomy) 
that they were entitled to enjoy by virtue of their social roles and that 
their victims, by virtue of theirs, had no right to de
 
35 Id. at 110-11; see also Dershowitz, supra note 32, at 27 (“The tactic of putting the 
dead or maimed victim on trial and getting the jury to identify with the defendant 
can be dangerous. . . . Everyone loves vigilante justice when the vigilantes are on 
‘our side,’ but they hate it when it the vigilantes are on ‘their side.’ ”). 
36 Victoria Nourse, The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judg-
ment in the Criminal Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1395 (1998). 
37 See id. at 1449-53; see also Cynthia Lee, Murder and the Reasonable Man: Passion 
and Fear in the Criminal Courtroom (2003) (arguing that traditional defenses have 
been patterned and applied in ways that reflect dominant gender and race norms); 
Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 307-11, 327-38, 342-46 (arguing voluntary 
manslaughter doctrine, and self-defense, duress, and insanity defenses all evaluate 
defendants’ and victims’ characters against background of dominant norms); Carol 
S. Steiker, Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibi-
tion, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 1857, 1864-67 (1999) (concluding self-defense, insanity, du-
ress, provocation and necessity doctrine all “turn on some normative evaluation of 
the defendant's reasons for acting”); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law 
Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 Yale L.J. 1331 (1997) (concluding that moral 
assessments of motive explain application of Model Penal Code “Extreme Emo-
tional or Mental Disturbance” conception of manslaughter). For a New Normativ-
ist critique of the use of “voluntarist” rhetoric in Canadian criminal law, see Ben-
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Growing receptivity to the claim of battered women and like de-
fendants, according to the New Normativists, reflects merely a shift 
in the cultural norms that decisionmakers (and the rest of us) use to 
appraise the appropriateness of the values expressed in offenders’ 
emotions.38 It’s a politically partisan objection to that shift in norms 
that explains why abuse-excuse critics see a denigration “individual 
responsibility” only in the law’s solicitude to the battered woman, and 
not in its historical (and now contested) solicitude toward the cuck-
old.39 
But as strongly as the New Normativists disagree with abuse-
excuse critics, they actually share the critics’ apprehension of the 
dominance of the Partisan Values Model of decisionmaking. Whereas 
the critics express disappointment over the denigration of the Neutral 
Umpire Model, the New Normativists take issue only with the reluc-
tance of those who expound the law (whether from the bench or 
from the ivory tower) to admit that the Neutral Umpire Model is and 
always has been a fiction. Nourse and others call for a critical “un-
masking” of the law—a relentless deconstruction of the “voluntarist” 
and “consequentialist” idioms out of which “justification” and “ex-
cuse” rationales are constructed—so that the law’s “evaluative” face 
can be exposed to plain view.40 Undistracted by assertions that only 
 
jamin L. Berger, Emotions and the Veil of Voluntarism: The Loss of Judgment in Canadian 
Crimianl Law 51 McGill Law Journal 99 (2006). 
38 See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 346-51. 
39 See Nourse, supra note 36, at 1461 (“Enamored by tradition, Wilson fails to see 
. . . that law has always exercised judgment, [and] simply has lost the ability to see 
that this is what it is doing. . . . Wilson . . . is only willing to judge in one direction, 
headed toward the past. If this is common sense, then it is a particular kind-what is 
common turns out to be what is well-established and, if this is judgment, then it is 
a particular kind. . . .”); see also Dan M. Kahan, Two Liberal Fallacies in the Hate Crimes 
Debate, 20 L. & Phil. 175, 192 (2001) (“The only thing that makes the ‘abuse ex-
cuse’ epithet resonate is that the identity of the virtuous outlaw has changed as 
traditional hierarchical norms have come under attack from new, egalitarian ones: 
he used to be the vengeful cuckold; she’s now the battered woman.”); Steiker, supra 
note 37, at 1871 (“Wilson's inability to see that his defense of the ‘traditional’ law 
of provocation was a kind of ‘abuse excuse’ itself, arose from the uncontroversial 
nature of that traditional (partial) excuse. . . . It is only when law reformers seek to 
write in new judgments about reasonableness that the evaluative nature of the 
criminal law appears prominent and, necessarily, controversial.”). 
40 Nourse, supra note 36, at 1461, 1466-67; see also Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 
1, at 373 (“Our primary normative claim in this Article has been that the law would 
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one side or the other is being partisan rather than “neutral,” we can 
then proceed to debate which partisan values we want to inform the 
law—those that would exonerate the battered woman, those that 
would acquit the beleaguered commuter, or some other set of under-
standings entirely. The New Normativity is, at root, deeply hostile to 
the humanist rationale that animates conventional self-defense doc-
trine. 
3. Self-Defensive Cognition 
In his essay, Reasonable Evidence of Reasonableness, Mark Kelman 
presents what is arguably the most elegant and compelling analysis of 
the parallels between the iconic battered woman beleaguered com-
muter cases.41 Reconstructing the discussion that transpires in a typi-
cal law school classroom, Kelman shows how the factual issues each 
case presents (the risk of danger posed by the victim; the alleged acu-
ity of insight that each defendant might posses by virtue of his or her 
personal experiences; the excusing deformity of perception that each 
defendant might be thought to be suffering from by virtue of circum-
stances not of his or her own choosing; the adequacy and feasibility 
of relying on alternative, lawful remedies), as well as the nature of the 
probabilistic inferences an observer would have to employ in resolv-
ing them, are essentially identical. 
The impasse, Kelman notes, is integral to the structure of the 
debate. Factual claims that are only “hypothetically falsifiable” can 
never “be uncontroversially verified [or] falsified.”42 Accordingly, 
whatever position a person takes on those claims must “reflect dis-
tinct social understandings that are doubtless as much about aspira-
tion as interpretations.”43  
 
be better if, in all instances, it were expressly evaluative.”); cf. Kahan, supra note 39, 
at 192 (“progressives should ruthlessly expose the partisan moral judgments that 
underlie the doctrines they want to abolish, and defend without embarrassment the 
ones that underlie the doctrines they propose instead.”); Steiker, supra note 37, 
(“controversy [over which motives the law should approve of should be] brought 
to the surface”). 
41 See Kelman, supra note 1. 
42 Id. at 188. 
43 Id. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 20 
  
                                                
Rather than implausibly insist, then, that the positions we favor 
reflect correct assessment of the “facts,” we should, Kelman argues, 
own up to the normative aspirations that we are relying on. We 
should “focus less on the accuracy of the defendants’ factual judg-
ments and more” on what sort of society we are constructing when 
we side with one or the other “in situations in which both they, and 
we, must inevitably be factually uncertain.”44 For Kelman himself, 
the claim of the beleaguered commuter is less compelling “not be-
cause he ‘inaccurately’ assessed risks, . . . but because the conse-
quences of acting as he did, given his perception of risk, [are] so hor-
rible.”45 When we can’t possibly know how dangerous the targets of 
lethal self-defense really are, it is “markedly less acceptable” to toler-
ate the killing of those who might be “utterly innocent”—mere pan-
handlers, or perhaps “taunters” or “nonviolent robbers”—than those 
“who certainly were not innocent”—battering men who, even if they 
did not intend to kill, were “established assaulters.”46 It “is even 
more reprehensible” to tolerate possibly mistaken killings “when the 
victims are selected on the bias of their membership in a historically 
subordinated racial group.”47 
More striking, though, than Kelman’s response to the parallels in 
the iconic cases—an argument that aligns him with Nourse’s New 
Normativists—is a puzzle Kelman poses and frets over. Why is the 
debate—in his classroom and outside it—framed in factual terms? 
He finds this especially perplexing in the case of his left-leaning stu-
dents, whom he perceives are philosophically disposed toward a 
“strong antipositivism” but who nevertheless feel constrained, 
probably for strategic reasons, to “fall back on the claim that they 
 
44 Id. at 177. 
45 Id. at 186. 
46 Id. at 177, 186. 
47 Id. at 176, 186. Cass Sunstein advances a similar position in an insightful com-
ment on Kelman’s essay. Sunstein argues that “symphath[y] with the battered 
wife’s claim of self defense” and “skepticism about the claim of self-defense in the 
subway case” reflects commitment to an “anticaste principle,” which furnishes 
reliable moral guidance on “what it is best to do or how it is best to act in the face 
of factual uncertainty.” Cass R. Sunstein, On Finding Facts, in Questions of Evi-
dence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disciplines 197 (J. Chandler, A. 
I. Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994). 
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have got the cold, brute-facts correct.”48 Indeed, Kelman surmises 
that even those who find his own analysis persuasive are likely to 
continue to find themselves impelled to defend their positions with 
empirical claims: “We may ultimately trust our normative judgments 
more,” he writes “but we are still likely to claim, with unbending sup-
port from our political allies, that we are assessing factual judgment, 
objective clarity of vision.”49 Why exactly? Kelman surmises that po-
litical advocacy is constrained by an “Enlightenment dogma—that 
facts are universal, values particular”—that makes overt appeal to 
partisan commitments taboo or suspect.50 
What we are describing as the third model of self-defense deci-
sionmaking—the Self-defensive Cognition position—suggests a dif-
ferent solution to Kelman’s puzzle. Kelman’s leftist students, his own 
ideological allies, and everyone else really believe that the “cold, brute-
facts” support the outcomes they favor in the battered woman and 
beleaguered commuter cases. They don’t think that they are siding one 
or another self-defense claimant based on their political ideologies. 
Nevertheless, what causes those individuals to find some defendants’ 
claims factually credible and others’ not is the psychic costs and bene-
fits of such beliefs to persons who hold their defining commitments. 
In effect, the impact of values on outcome judgments is mediated 
by fact perceptions. That is, instead of directly appraising an instance 
of deadly force by applying partisan values that themselves might be 
extraneous or even hostile to the humanist principles the doctrine 
embodies, decisionmakers’ values indirectly determine their appraisals 
by shaping what they perceive doctrinally relevant facts to be. 
 
 
48 Mark Kelman, A Rejoinder to Cass R. Sunstein, in Reasonable Evidence of Reasonable-
ness, in Questions of Evidence: Proof, Practice, and Persuasion Across the Disci-
plines 202 (J. Chandler, A. I. Davidson and H. Harootunian ed., 1994). 
49 Kelman, supra note 1, at 188.  
50 Kelman supra note 48, at 202. 
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Result
Fact
Perceptions
Partisan
Values
 
Figure 3. Self-Defensive Cognition Model 
This account flows out of three psychological theories. The first 
is the culpable control theory of blame attribution.51 Across persons and 
societies, blame attributions have been shown to conform to a rela-
tively uniform template, the elements of which—volition, action, 
causation, and harm—inform judgments of the control that a puta-
tively blameworthy agent exerted over an undesirable outcome. But 
based on an extensive body of experimental research, the “culpable 
control” theory posits that individuals’ perceptions of the elements of 
the blame template are guided by affective and moral responses to 
facts extraneous to those elements. Facts most likely to generate this 
effect relate to the agent’s conformity to social norms generally. 
Thus, a person who deviates from widely held community expecta-
tions (ones, say, relating to drug use or to sexual behavior) will be 
more likely to be perceived as having acted “volitionally” or having 
“caused” an undesirable result unrelated to such deviancy (say, a car 
accident) than will a person who conforms to those same norms.52 In 
effect, individuals are motivated to conform their perceptions of blame-
relevant facts, particularly ones that defy direct observation, to the 
their norm-pervaded evaluations of a person’s values and character 
more generally. 
The second theory is identity-protective cognition. Individuals tend to 
process factual information in a manner that reinforces “self-
definitional beliefs,” including ones tied to their “values [and] social 
                                                 
51 See generally Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Control and the Psychology of Blame, 126 Psych. 
Bull. 556 (2000). 
52 See id. at 564; Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 
368 (1992). 
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identities.”53 Obviously, values don’t logically depend on beliefs.54 But 
practically speaking, certain beliefs—that virtuous conduct is not 
harmful to others or our ourselves; that vicious or base conduct 
doesn’t conduce to personal or societal well-being—make it easier to 
persist in our values than do their opposites. Because abandoning or 
revising his or her values can undermine a person’s sense of integrity, 
and thus lower his self-esteem, it is natural for an individual, psycho-
logically speaking, to resist information that challenges beliefs sup-
portive of that person’s values.55 This dynamic is accentuated when 
the values and associated with beliefs are connected to group with 
which a person strongly identifies. Individuals depend on group 
membership for various benefits—material, reputational, and emo-
tional.56 Individuals thus have even more incentive to resist accep-
tance of information that threatens to drive a wedge between them 
and their peers. Accordingly, as a means of psychological self-
protection, individuals selectively credit information depending on 
whether it bolsters or challenges beliefs that cohere with their self-
defining values, particularly ones that predominate in or support 
practices important to a self-defining group.57 
The third supporting theory is cultural cognition of risk. Cultural 
cognition refers to the tendency of persons, as a result of identity-
protective cognition and other mechanisms, to conform beliefs about 
the extent of societal dangers to shared understandings of how soci-
ety should be organized.58 Persons who hold an “individualist” 
worldview, for example, react skeptically to claims of environmental 
 
53 Serena Chen, Kimberly Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and 
Systematic Processing, 10 Psych. Inq. 44, 45 (1999). 
54 See, of course, David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk. 3, pt 1, § 1 (1739-
40). 
55 See generally Cohen et al., Partisan Divide, supra note 3. 
56 See generally Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for In-
terpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 Psychol. Bull. 497 
(1995). 
57 See generally Sherman & Cohen, supra note 3, at 119-20; Cohen et al., Partisan Di-
vide, supra note 3; Giner-Sorolla & Chaiken, supra note 3; Serena Chen, Kimberly 
Duckworth & Shelly Chaiken, Motivated Heuristic and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. 
Inq. 44 (1999). 
58 See generally Dan M. Kahan, Paul Slovic, Donald Braman & John Gastil, Fear of 
Democracy: A Cultural Critique of Sunstein on Risk, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1071 (2006). 
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risks, the widespread acceptance of which would threaten the auton-
omy of markets and other private orderings; persons who subscribe 
to an “egalitarian” worldview, in contrast, find it congenial to credit 
such claims because they justify regulating commercial activities pro-
ductive of inequalities in wealth and status. Cultural norms can also 
generate variance in the risk perceptions of those who share a world-
view: hierarchical and individualistic men, for example, rely much 
more on access to firearms to enable their performance of cultural 
roles, and thus tend to be much more skeptical of the risks guns pose 
to society, than do hierarchical and individualistic women.59 
The Self-Defensive Cognition Model blends these three theories 
together. Self-defense doctrine supplies a particular type of blaming 
template. Accordingly, one might expect, consistent with the culpable 
control theory, that persons evaluating self-defense cases would con-
form their perceptions of the elements of that template—whether the 
putative aggressor did in fact pose a deadly threat to the defender; 
whether the defender honestly and reasonably perceived matters in 
that way; whether the defender’s capacity to avoid any threat by non-
deadly alternatives—to extradoctrinal social norms. The theory of 
self-protective cognition implies that those norms are likely to be 
ones that are central to their identities.  
For its part, the cultural cognition theory suggests which norms 
are likely to have this impact—namely, the ones associated with the 
worldviews that that theory features. Appraisals of self-defense, like 
appraisals of the dangers of climate change, gun possession, socially 
deviant behavior, and the like, involve perceptions of risk. And like 
those issues, controversial self-defense cases are likely to be contro-
versial precisely because they are pregnant with implications for 
competing norms, hierarchical and egalitarian, individualistic and 
communitarian. Does racism remain prevalent in public attitudes and 
behavior? Is society organized in an objectionably patriarchical fash-
ion? Is our society being damaged by a decline in authority in public 
and private spheres?  Is that decline a byproduct of an excessive con-
cern about racial or gender inequality? Is the law typically an instru-
ment of repression of vulnerable groups? Or is the law now insuffi-
 
59 See Dan M. Kahan, Donald Braman, John Gastil, Paul Slovic & C.K. Mertz, 
Culture and Identity-Protective Cognition: Explaining the White Male Effect in Risk Percep-
tion, J. Empirical L. Stud. (forthcoming 2007) available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=995634. 
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ciently responsive to protecting law-abiding citizens from predation 
by lawbreakers? Is private physical force an appropriate means for 
securing order, in public or private domains? Is the protection of in-
dividuals from unwarranted violence primarily a responsibility of the 
community or is it an inalienable prerogative of those individuals 
themselves? Even if individuals don’t understand themselves to be 
answering these questions when they apply self-defense doctrine, they 
are impelled to views of the facts supportive of their preferred an-
swers. 
Values do drive outcome judgments, on this account, but in a 
manner different from that contemplated by proponents of the Parti-
san Value Model. The abuse excuse critics paint too cynical a picture 
of self-defense decisionmakers. Such individuals aren’t brazenly ig-
noring facts that disappoint their partisan values; they are honestly 
deciding based on the facts, albeit the ones that their values dispose 
them to perceive. The New Normativists, in contrast, impute too 
much sophistication to the protagonists in political disputes over self-
defense cases. These citizens aren’t covert Aristotelians engaged in 
appraising offenders’ and victims’ motives and characters against the 
background of dueling conceptions of the good life.60 Nor are they 
(outside of Stanford law classrooms, certainly, but probably even in-
side them) epistemologically skeptical “antipositivists” who are stra-
tegically availing themselves of “Enlightenment dogma—facts are 
universal, values particular”—to disguise their agenda to conform the 
law to their “aspirations.”61 Culturally diverse individuals (jurors, but 
citizens forming judgments about self-defense cases generally) hon-
estly believe they are putting their own partisan commitments aside 
and basing their judgments on their perception of the facts in exactly 
the way the Neutral Umpire Model contemplates. But because their 
partisan values shape their cognition of the facts, they systematically 
differ in their perceptions of “balls” and “strikes”.  
This interpretation of political conflict over self-defense verdicts, 
we’re convinced, raises a thicket of complicated normative and pre-
 
60 Cf. Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 304 (claiming that “it is possible to 
make sense of the law only by imputing to it a theory of moral accountability con-
sistent with the evaluative conception of emotion” such as “Aristotle's position on 
character—that it is appropriate to expect a person to value the right things, in the 
right ways, at the right times”). 
61 Kelman, supra note 1, at 202. 
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scriptive questions. By delimiting the conditions under which private 
citizens can avail themselves of lethal violence, self-defense doctrine 
plays an important regulatory function. But as our account of its ra-
tionale makes clear, the doctrine also performs a critical political func-
tion, affirming the law’s humanist commitment to the supreme value of 
human life and the equal value of all citizens’ lives. The doctrine obvi-
ously can’t perform either of these functions effectively if citizens 
ignore the facts and rely instead on partisan group commitments 
when they appraise instances of private violence. But can it do it ef-
fectively if citizens honestly conform their judgment to facts that 
cognitively derive their partisan values? Do factual disagreements 
founded on self-defensive cognition pose challenges to the accuracy 
of verdicts, or to their political legitimacy, that are any different from 
factual disagreements originating in myriad other sources? If so, is 
there anything that can be done to mute the impact of this particular 
psychological dynamic?  
Interesting questions, we believe. But the importance of answer-
ing them presupposes that the Self-Defensive Cognition Model really 
does explain political conflict over self-defense verdicts. Whether that 
is so is, of course, an empirical question. And it is one that we con-
ducted an experimental study to try to answer. 
II. THE EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
We conducted an experimental study designed to pit the Neutral 
Umpire, Partisan Value, and Self-Defensive Cognition Models against 
one another. As we’ll explain in more detail, subjects read one of two 
vignettes patterned on the iconic “battered woman” and “belea-
guered commuter” cases. Subjects then responded to a battery of 
questions, which were analyzed to assess the relationship between the 
subjects’ perceptions of key facts, their positions on the appropriate 
results in the cases, and their values, political leanings, and other indi-
vidual characteristics, all of which were also measured.  
Although subjects were requested to adopt the perspective of ju-
rors in the cases, the design of the study was primarily intended to 
shed light on how members of the public form judgments about con-
troversial self-defense cases generally. Political conflict over self-
defense verdicts is the phenomenon we are trying to explain. Such 
conflict inheres less in the verdicts of individual juries than in public 
reactions to them. Members of the public (not unlike law students in 
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the classroom) react, by and large, not to their first-hand exposure to 
the evidence presented in such cases but rather to more abbreviated, 
derivative accounts that, like our vignettes, tend to be subject to 
competing interpretations. On what basis, then, are members of the 
public forming such confident conclusions about the correctness or 
incorrectness of jury verdicts in such cases? Are they relying on their 
best albeit speculative judgments about the facts? Are they simply 
reacting to the more accessible cultural or political overtones such 
cases present? Or are they, as the Self-Defensive Cognition Model 
supposes being motivated to resolve factual ambiguities in the man-
ner most supportive of their defining commitments? 
A. Study Design and Hypotheses 
1. Sample 
The study sample consisted of approximately 1,600 individuals. 
Approximately 51% female, 75% white, and 9% African-American, 
the subjects were drawn randomly from a demographically diverse 
and nationally representative panel of some 40,000 on-line survey 
respondents assembled by Knowledge Networks for participation in 
scholarly public opinion analysis.62 
2. Vignettes 
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment 
groups, which were labeled “Battered Woman” and “Beleaguered 
Commuter,” respectively.63 In the former, subjects read a vignette in 
which Julie, a woman chronically beaten and degraded by William, 
her abusive husband, shot him in the head as he slept. In the latter, 
subjects read a vignette in which George, a middle-aged white man, 
shot and killed Alvin, a male African-American teenager, on a subway 
 
62 Numerous studies have shown that the on-line samples and testing methods of 
Knowledge Networks yield results equivalent in reliability to conventional random-
digit-dial surveys, and studies based on those samples and methods are routinely 
published in academic journals. See 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/2005aapor.html; 
http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/ganp/docs/List%20of%20Journals%208-
28-2006.pdf A more complete description of the composition of Knowledge Net-
works and of the demographic characteristics of the sample used in this study ap-
pears in Appendix A. 
63 The vignettes appear in Appendix A. 
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platform after Alvin stated, “Give me some money, man.” The vi-
gnettes were described as presenting the “facts and evidence” in “a 
controversial criminal trial,” and each subject was advised that we 
were interested “to know what you would decide if you were on the 
jury in that trial.” Although patterned loosely on real cases (State v. 
Norman64 and State v. Goetz,65 respectively), the vignettes were struc-
tured to be reasonably parallel in a number of respects that we antici-
pated would generate factual disagreements among subjects.66 
a. Victim dangerousness. In both vignettes, the facts were character-
ized in a manner intended to create ambiguity as to whether the vic-
tim posed—or might reasonably have been perceived to pose—an 
immediate threat of death or great bodily harm. The most obvious 
reason to doubt that in Battered Woman was that William was sleep-
ing at the time he was shot. Nevertheless, he had beaten Julie earlier 
in the day and was now only napping, suggesting the possibility that 
he might at any moment awaken and immediately resume his pattern 
of violence. At least some persons, then, would likely credit as rea-
sonable Julie’s (professed) perception that she had to act immediately 
because she “knew when [William] woke up this time he was going to 
hurt me really bad.”  
In Beleaguered Commuter, Alvin had no previous contact of any 
sort, violent or otherwise, with George and had not explicitly threat-
ened him. Nevertheless, Alvin’s request for money would likely strike 
some, but certainly not all, persons as menacing, and George stated 
that he “could tell from [Alvin’s] body language and the aggressive 
tone of his voice” that Alvin “was going to hurt me real bad.” Some, 
but certainly not all, persons would also likely view Alvin’s race, age, 
and gender, as well as the urban setting of the encounter, as reinforc-
ing the inference that Alvin’s request for money was a prelude to a 
violent attack.67  
A “pocket knife” was also found on Alvin’s person. Those dis-
posed to see him as potentially dangerous would likely see this fact as 
 
64 78 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989). 
65 497 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1986). 
66 In this respect, we were guided in particular by Kelman’s superb discussion of 
the factual parallels in the iconic cases as they are typically presented in law school 
discussions. See Kelman, supra note 1. 
67 See Armour, supra note 1, at 790-93. 
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confirmation of Alvin’s violent intentions. Others would point out 
that George didn’t have any awareness that Alvin was carrying the 
knife, possession of which is consistent with perfectly innocent inten-
tions (including self-defensive ones on Alvin’s own part). 
b. Previous exposure to violence. In both vignettes, the defendants 
were described as having been exposed to previous acts of violence. 
This parallel too injects factual ambiguity into both cases. 
Julie had suffered repeated physical beatings at the hands of Wil-
liam, “some of which resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; 
twice a broken nose) requiring emergency medical treatment.” This 
behavior, in addition to reinforcing the impression that William 
posed an objectively reasonable threat of violence, also supports the 
inference that Julie honestly perceived William would harm her upon 
awakening.  
Yet one could also draw exactly the opposite set of inferences. 
William’s “persistent[] abuse[]” of Julie “during their ten-year mar-
riage,” some might argue, had never created the degree of risk—one of 
“death or great bodily harm”—contemplated by the doctrine. So why 
suppose that Julie honestly or reasonably perceived that she faced a 
threat of that magnitude in this instance?  
One reply is that precisely because she had endured so many at-
tacks over so long a period, Julie had developed unique insight into 
William’s propensities and was thus better situated than anyone else 
to gauge whether “this time,” as she said, “he was going to hurt [her] 
really bad.”68 But just as plausibly (some might think) the string of 
violent but nonlethal attacks could be viewed as supplying Julie with a 
motive—resentment or hatred—to kill William notwithstanding the 
absence of any genuine apprehension that failing to do so would have 
put her at risk of a deadly attack. 
George had suffered three previous muggings, during one of 
which he had “been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his 
eye.” These attacks had been carried out by persons other than Alvin. 
Nevertheless, some might conclude that a person who had been 
 
68 See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 374 (N.J. 1984) (“Depending on its content, the 
expert's testimony might also enable the jury to find that the battered wife, because 
of the prior beatings, numerous beatings, as often as once a week, for seven years, 
from the day they were married to the day he died, is particularly able to predict 
accurately the likely extent of violence in any attack on her.”). 
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mugged multiple times in the past would be more likely to perceive 
he was about to be assaulted again in a situation like the one George 
faced.69 In addition, because the muggers in those instances, too, had 
been “teenaged, African American males,” it is plausible to imagine 
(that is, to imagine some readers’ imagining) that Alvin’s race, age, 
and gender might have created at least an honest apprehension on 
George’s part that Alvin also meant him harm.70 
But again opposing inferences are also possible. The previous 
muggings, although in one case quite violent, hadn’t (some would say; 
others would disagree) posed a lethal risk, so why suppose George 
either honestly or reasonably perceived he’d be subjected to that level 
of physical danger rather than merely robbed? The reply might be 
that the previous muggings, combined with experience from urban 
living generally, endowed George with superior insight into the vio-
lent potential of such interactions, one that people without a similar 
background are in particular unfit to second guess.71 But just as plau-
sibly (to some), those muggings could be understood to have filled 
George with a passion—informed, very likely, by racial animus—to 
avenge the humiliating treatment he perceived himself to have suf-
fered. In that case, George might have been expected to lash out with 
lethal violence against Alvin, as a symbolic representative of the class 
of persons who had mistreated him, despite the lack of any genuine 
(much less reasonable) apprehension that Alvin posed a deadly threat. 
c. Opportunity to flee. Another parallel in the vignettes relates to the 
feasibility of flight as an alternative to the use of deadly violence. 
Julie, some would observe, could have (indeed, would have) simply 
left her home during William’s nap if she genuinely perceived that he 
would attack her upon awakening. But others would likely dispute the 
feasibility of flight (to where? for how long? without packing essen-
tials—or after taking the time to do so, incurring the risk of discovery 
and violent retaliation by a roused William, etc.). They could bolster 
 
69 See Kelman, supra note 1, at 174-75. 
70 See Armour, supra note 1, at 799-800. 
71 See Kelman, supra note 1, at 175; cf. Elijah Anderson, Streetwise: Race, Class, and 
Change in an Urban Community (1990) (observing that urban residents develop 
intuitive sensitivity to “code of the street” that is essential to avoiding dangerous 
confrontations). 
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their reasoning with the rationale, if not the letter, of the so-called 
“Castle Doctrine.”72  
Similar issues arise in the Beleaguered Commuter case. George, 
it might be thought, could have (would have) backed away, yelled for 
help, or simply turned and run had he really thought that he was 
about to be mugged, much less lethally assaulted. But some would 
dismiss this suggestion as naïve, the product likely of inexperience 
with the resolve of violent inner-city criminals, the cramped confines 
of crowded subway stations, and the cowardice or selfish indifference 
of urban residents in the face of the brazen acts of predation. Much 
like an “uplifted knife,”73 it could be said, such circumstances do not 
conduce to calm assessments of one’s options. 
d. Previous involvement of police. The defendants in both vignettes 
were also depicted as having previously availed themselves unsuccess-
fully of police assistance. George reported each of the three previous 
muggings, “but the police failed to make any arrests.” Some readers 
might suspect that the apparent lack of ability on the part of the state 
to protect George (and one might suppose other mugging victims) 
would increase his anxiety and fear and thus dispose him honestly 
(perhaps even reasonably) to perceive the need to use self-help to 
protect himself from serious harm. Others would see the same ex-
periences with the police as a motivation to resort to vigilantism. 
“Three times the police arrested William for assaulting Julie, but 
released him from custody each time after Julie declined to press 
charges.” Julie’s failure to follow through might be thought to sup-
port the inference that she wasn’t genuinely convinced that he posed 
a deadly threat. And if she didn’t see him that way in general, it seems 
less likely she would have perceived him that way on the occasion in 
which she finally shot him. Alternatively, Julie might be thought to 
 
72 In many jurisdictions, the “Castle Doctrine” would not excuse retreat in a case 
involving cohabitants. See Catherine L. Carpenter, Of the Enemy Within, The Castle 
Doctrine, and Self-Defense, 86 Marq. L. Rev. 653, 671-72 (2003). Nevertheless, in 
those states, a jury could still consider the difficulty of or uncertainty surrounding 
escape in determining whether a person who used deadly force against a cohabitant 
honestly and reasonably perceived a threat of death or great bodily harm. See, e.g., 
Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004 (D.C. 1986). Our subjects received no 
specific instructions relating to Castle Doctrine or to the duty (or lack thereof) to 
retreat in self-defense cases. 
73 Brown, 256 U.S. at 343. 
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have dropped the charges because of a well-founded perception that 
pressing charges would only increase her risk by infuriating William, 
whom the state would not have the resources or resolve to incapaci-
tate. If so, one might find it easier to imagine that Julie would have 
formed the honest (perhaps even reasonable) belief that one day 
she’d need to use lethal force to incapacitate William herself. 
e. Premeditation. Both defendants shot and killed their victims with 
handguns. George obtained his weapon after the third mugging; Julie 
obtained hers from her mother’s home on the day she shot William, 
after he had severely beaten her. One could see the decision of either 
defendant or of both as evidencing a premeditated motive to kill for 
purposes of vengeance or vindication of dignity, honor, or autonomy. 
Alternatively, one could see the decision of either or both as mani-
festing a level of fear that matured into an honest (even reasonable) 
perception of deadly risk at the fateful moment when the victim was 
shot. 
f. Expert psychiatric testimony. Each defendant was described as 
having presented expert psychiatric testimony at trial. Subjects who 
read Battered Woman learned that “Dr. Leonard Wallace, a Ph.D. 
psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university,” had testified that 
Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome”; subjects who 
read Beleaguered Commuter learned that that the same witness had 
testified that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress disor-
der.” Readers could have understood Dr. Wallace’s description of the 
offenders’ respective conditions as supporting the genuineness of 
their perceptions that they honestly faced inescapable threats to their 
lives. Readers so inclined could also have treated his testimony as 
evidence of the reasonableness of either offender’s perception, given 
Dr. Wallace’s characterization of the effect of previous exposure to 
violence “on [his or her] psyche.” Finally, Dr. Wallace’s statements 
on the stand echoed each defendant’s own claim that he or she “felt 
no choice” but shoot the victim, an element of each vignette de-
signed to suggest excusing impairment of volition. 
Nevertheless, readers of either case could also have dismissed 
the testimony of Dr. Wallace, a defense witness, as noncredible. In-
deed, a reader disposed to accept the “abuse excuse” critique 
(whether as a result of prior exposure to it or as a result an instinctive 
skepticism of psychiatric testimony) could even have treated the 
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presence of Dr. Wallace’s testimony as confirming the absence of any 
genuine merit in the defendant’s self-defense claim. 
3. Measures 
a. Perception of Facts. We measured subjects’ perceptions of vari-
ous facts by asking them to indicate on a six-point scale the level of 
their agreement or disagreement with various propositions. The 
propositions concerned facts that a juror would likely consider if she 
were motivated to decide her assigned case consistent with self-
defense doctrine understood in light of its conventional justification-
based and excuse-based rationales: 
It isn’t likely that [William/Alvin] would have severely harmed or 
killed [Julie/George] if [Julie/George] hadn’t shot him. 
It was unreasonable for [Julie/George] to shoot [William/Alvin] 
because there were other ways [she/he] could have protected [her-
self/himself]. 
Because [Julie/George] suffered from [battered woman syn-
drome/post-traumatic stress syndrome], [Julie/George] can’t be 
blamed for any mistake [she/he] may have made about how much 
of a danger [William/Alvin] posed at the time [Julie/George] shot 
him. 
Because [she had been beaten so many times before/George had 
been violently mugged before], [Julie/George] was in a better situa-
tion than other people to judge how much of a danger [Wil-
liam/Alvin] posed to [her/him] when he shot him. 
The failure of the police to keep [her/him] safe gave [Julie/George] 
good reason to believe [she/he] had to use deadly force to protect 
[herself/himself]. 
[William/Alvin] himself was responsible for causing [Julie/George] 
to believe [she/he] faced a threat of death or grievous bodily harm. 
Considered individually or jointly, these items are only a proxy 
for a subject’s perception of the facts in the case. Accordingly, sub-
ject responses to the fact items in both the Battered Woman and Be-
leaguered Commuter treatment groups were combined into scales, 
BW_Facts and BC_Facts, which by virtue of their high degree of reli-
ability (α = .73 and α = .77, respectively) can be regarded as valid in-
dicators of subjects’ latent dispositions to adopt interpretations of the 
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facts supportive or hostile to the respective defendant’s self-defense 
claims.74 
b. Outcome Judgments. In each treatment group, subjects were in-
structed to that the cases would be decided according to the follow-
ing legal directives: 
Murder. Anyone who intentionally kills another person without a 
lawful defense is guilty of murder and shall be sentenced to life im-
prisonment. 
Self-defense. A person has a defense to murder if that person honestly 
and reasonably believed that deadly force was necessary to repel an 
immediate threat of death or severe bodily harm. 
The subjects’ own perceptions of the appropriate results in the cases 
were measured with two items, which stated propositions with which 
the subjects were to indicate on a six-point scale the level of their 
agreement or disagreement: 
[Julie/George] should be convicted of murder. 
[Julie/George] should be acquitted of murder because she killed in 
self-defense 
Responses again formed highly reliable scales (BW_Aquit, α = .87; 
BC_Acquit, α = .79), which were used to represent latent dispositions 
to acquit the respective defendants. 
c. Cultural worldviews. Subjects’ “cultural worldviews” were also 
measured. The purpose of collecting this information was to facilitate 
assessment of the subjects’ worldviews in their perceptions of the 
facts and their assessments of the appropriate result. 
The worldview scales were patterned on a scheme developed by 
the late anthropologist Mary Douglas. Douglas characterizes world-
views, or preferences for how society should be organized, along two 
cross-cutting dimensions, “group” and “grid.”75 A “high group” 
worldview generates a preference for a communitarian ordering in 
 
74 Cronbach’s alpha (α) is a statistic for measuring the internal validity of attitudinal 
scales. In effect, it measures the degree of intercorrelation that exists among vari-
ous items within a scale; a high score suggests that the items can be treated as a 
valid measure of a latent, or unmeasured, attitude or trait. Generally, α ≥ .70 sug-
gests scale validity. See generally Jose M. Cortina, What Is Coefficient Alpha: An Exami-
nation of Theory and Applications, 78 J. Applied Psychol. 98 (1993).  
75 See Mary Douglas, Natural Symbols: Explorations in Cosmology (1970). 
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which the interests of the individual are subordinated to the needs of 
the collective, which is in turn responsible for securing the conditions 
of individual flourishing. A “low group” worldview, in contrast, co-
heres with a preference for an individualist ordering in which individu-
als are expected to secure the conditions of their own flourishing 
without interference or assistance from the collective. A “high grid” 
worldview corresponds to a preference for a relatively hierarchical or-
dering, in which entitlements, obligations, opportunities and offices 
are all assigned on the basis of conspicuous and largely fixed attrib-
utes, such as gender, race, lineage, class, and the like. A “low grid” 
worldview, in contrast, generates a preference for an egalitarian order-
ing that emphatically rejects the proposition that such distinctions 
should figure in this way in societal conditions. 
The two dimensions of worldview contemplated by “group-
grid” were measured (before subjects read the assigned vignette and 
responded the fact and result items) with scales used in previous 
studies of the cultural cognition of risk.76 “Individualism-
Communitarianism” (or simply, “Individualism”) consisted of “dis-
agree-agree” items that assessed the relative priority that subjects as-
signed to group and individual interests (e.g., “The government 
should do more to advance society’s goals, even if that means limiting 
the freedom and choices of individuals”) and their expectations about 
how responsibilities should be divided between society and its mem-
bers (e.g., “Too many people today expect society to do things for 
them that they should be doing for themselves”). “Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism” (or simply, “Hierarchy”) consisted of items that as-
sessed subjects’ attitudes toward socially stratified roles (e.g., “We 
have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”) and their 
toward deviancy from the same (e.g., “A lot of problems in our soci-
ety today come from the decline in the traditional family, where the 
man works and the woman stays home”). Both Individualism 
(α = .84) and Hierarchy (α = .82) were highly reliable measures of the 
latent disposition of subjects toward those respective sets of world-
views. 
To facilitate comparisons of subjects identified by their world-
views, we assigned subjects to cultural groups. Based on the relation-
ship of their scores to the median on each scale, we classified subjects 
 
76 See Kahan et al., supra note 59. 
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as either “Hierarchs” or “Egalitarians” and as either “Individualists” 
or “Communitarians.”  
d. Individual characteristics generally. Finally, we collected data on 
various other individual characteristics that we anticipated might in-
fluence subjects’ perceptions of the facts and results in the Battered 
Woman and Beleaguered Commuter cases. These included socio-
demographic characteristics, such as gender, race, household income, 
education level, and community type (urban or nonurban). They also 
included political dispositions, measured by self-reported ideology 
(on a seven-point, liberal-conservativism scale) and party affiliation 
(Democrat, Republican, Independent/Other). 
4. Hypotheses 
We have proposed that self-defensive cognition generates politi-
cal conflict over self-defense cases. The study was geared to permit 
testing of several discrete sets of hypotheses that flow out of this 
claim. 
a. Overall effect of values. One is that the Battered Woman and Be-
leaguered Commuter vignettes would in fact divide subjects of di-
verse values. Consensus on the outcomes, or disagreement unrelated 
to partisan values, would be consistent with the Neutral Umpire 
Model. We predicted, however, that our vignettes would in fact gen-
erate mirror-image forms of political polarization.  
Thus, in the Battered Woman condition, subjects who identified 
themselves as liberals and Democrats, we surmised, would be in-
clined to accept, those who identified themselves as conservatives 
and Republicans to reject, the defendant’s asserted claim of self-
defense. In the Beleaguered Commuter condition, the positions of 
subjects so defined would be reversed. 
We anticipated similar patterns for subjects defined by their cul-
tural worldviews. For Hierarchs, the behavior of the victim in Belea-
guered Commuter would likely connote the breakdown of social or-
der in urban settings, and the response of the defendant a righteous 
vindication of the honor of norm-abiding persons. Egalitarians, in 
contrast, would readily identify the defendant’s behavior, and positive 
reactions to them, with racial dominance. Individualists, we conjec-
tured, would see in the defendant’s resort to self-help a virtuous as-
sertion of self-reliance. Communitarians, in contrast, would likely as-
sociate the defendant’s response with an encroachment on the pre-
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rogative of society at large to secure order. They would also likely 
resent approval of his actions as an implicit denial of society’s com-
plicity in conditions that conduce to crime and disorder, and its obli-
gation to ameliorate the same. We thus predicted that Hierarchs and 
Individualists, but not Egalitarians and Communitarians, would be 
disposed to credit the defendant’s self-defense claim. 
The Battered Woman vignette, too, is ripe with competing cul-
tural meanings. Egalitarians would thus likely equate approval of the 
defendant’s self-defense claim in that case with due recognition of the 
injustice of male domination and society’s failure to take effective 
action to protect women from domestic violence. Hierarchs might 
not be completely averse to the use of physical force as a mode of 
maintaining discipline within a well-ordered home; but even if (as 
likely) they understood William to have engaged in violence unsanc-
tioned by an prerogative associated with his role, they would likely 
react skeptically to the “battered woman defense” as evidencing gen-
eral hostility to patriarchal modes of household organization. We thus 
predicted that Egalitarians but not Hierarchs would be inclined to 
afford Julie a defense. 
The Battered Woman case was likely to strike Communitarians 
and Individualists, however, as less clear cut. We surmised that 
Communitarians would likely see William’s behavior as a tyrannical 
breach of norms of solidarity that should inform household life. At 
the same time, they would also likely be leery of Julie’s resort to self-
help, much as they would be leery of George’s in the Beleaguered 
Commuter condition, as a tacit denigration of societal prerogatives 
and responsibilities to police such breaches. By the same token, Indi-
vidualists might well approve of Julie’s resort to self-help, much as 
they would George’s, as an expression of virtuous self-reliance. How-
ever, it also struck as possible that Individualists would react less 
sympathetically to Julie insofar as use of a gun for self-protection 
would likely seem more in keeping with individualist norms that de-
fine male roles of men than those that define female ones.77 We thus 
formed no clear hypothesis about the likely effect of the Individual-
ist-Communitarian dimension of cultural worldview on subjects’ out-
come judgments in that condition. 
 
77 See id. 
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b. Values, results, and fact perceptions. We hypothesized not only that 
subjects’ values would generate differences of opinion on the correct 
outcomes in the two cases, but also that they would do so in the 
manner associated with the Self-Defensive Cognition Model. 
Whereas the Partisan Value Model posits that values determine fa-
vored outcomes in controversial cases directly, the Self-Defensive 
Cognition Model assumes that values determine outcome judgments 
indirectly (and subconsciously), though the influence that values have 
on decisionmakers’ perceptions of the facts. Accordingly, we pre-
dicted that the impact of partisan values on subjects’ outcome judg-
ments would, in both conditions, be mediated by the impact of those 
values on subjects’ perceptions of the facts. That is, after controlling 
for their impact on fact perceptions, subjects’ values, we predicted, 
would not explain variance in their views of what the results in the 
cases should be. 
We also predicted that cultural worldviews would have a larger 
impact on subjects’ perceptions of facts than would their political 
ideologies and party affiliations. Because conventional political com-
mitments cohere with group commitments essential to individuals’ 
identities, it would be perfectly consistent with the Self-Defensive 
Cognition Model for them to influence subjects’ factual perceptions. 
But based on previous studies, we anticipated that cultural world-
views would exert a greater influence than ideology and party affilia-
tion, in part because the worldview constructs furnish a more nu-
anced representation of how individuals’ defining values vary and in 
part because worldview measures do better than do political com-
mitment ones in explaining that policy preferences of individuals with 
moderate degrees of political sophistication.78 
c. Impact of other individual characteristics. We anticipated that other 
individual characteristics would also likely correspond with differ-
ences in outcome judgments in the cases. We predicted, in particular, 
that women would likely be more disposed than men to credit the 
self-defense claim in Battered Woman and that whites would be more 
 
78 See Aaron Wildavsky, Choosing Preferences by Constructing Institutions: A Cultural The-
ory of Preference Formation, 81 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1 (1987); Donald Braman, Dan M. 
Kahan & Paul Slovic, The Wildavsky Heuristic: The Cultural Orientation of Mass Political 
Opinion (July 2005) (unpublished manuscript, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=341841). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 39 
  
disposed than African-Americans to credit the self-defense claim in 
Beleaguered Commuter. 
Such effects could reflect a number of mechanisms. One would 
be a connection between these characteristics and self-defining group 
commitments that influence how individuals react to the cases. Gen-
der and race might themselves be groups of the sort or might corre-
late with others (political affiliations, e.g.) that are. If so, women 
might differ from men and African-Americans from whites either as 
a result of the direct effect of partisan group values on outcome judg-
ments or as a result of the indirect effect of such values on fact percep-
tions. 
Another reason to expect race and gender effects would be the 
correlation of these characteristics with differences in experiences, 
unrelated to values, that bear on individuals’ perception of the facts 
in the cases. Women, for example, might more readily take note of 
instances of domestic violence, or feel more vulnerable to it, and thus 
credit asserted fears of it more readily than do men. Likewise, whites 
might more readily take note of or otherwise feel vulnerable to inter-
racial violence and thus more readily credit expressed fears of it than 
do African-Americans; or African-Americans might be more aware of 
instances of racism than are whites, and thus more readily impute 
racist motives to persons in the position of the defendant in the Be-
leaguered Commuter case. 
We formulated a number of testable hypotheses aimed at sorting 
these possibilities out. One was that gender and race would not influ-
ence subjects’ outcome judgments directly, in a manner unmediated 
by their effect on subjects’ perceptions of the facts. Such a finding 
would rule out the inference that gender and race were connected to 
group commitments that influence subjects’ decisionmaking in the 
manner posited by the Partisan Value Model. 
Another hypothesis was that the impact of one or more direct 
partisan-value measures—either cultural worldviews, political ideol-
ogy, or party affiliation—would persist even after the impact of gen-
der, race, and other demographic characteristics on fact perceptions 
was taken into account. Absent such a finding, it would be impossible 
to rule out the possibility that political conflict over self-defense ver-
dicts arises from demographic characteristics that generate experi-
ence-based variance in fact perceptions unrelated to values. Indeed, it 
would arguably be consistent with the Neutral Umpire Model to find 
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that neither cultural worldviews, political ideology, nor party affilia-
tion generate variance in fact perceptions (or judgments of results 
directly) after controlling for race, gender, and other individual char-
acteristics. Conversely, a finding that individual characteristics exert 
little or no impact on fact perceptions relative to direct partisan-value 
measures would be most strongly corroborative of the Self-Defensive 
Cognition Model. 
 
Fact
Perceptions
Ideology & Party
Affiliation
Result
Cultural
Worldviews
Strong effect
Weak or no effect
Moderate or weak effect
Other Individual
Characteristics
Figure 4. Summary of Hypotheses on Influence of Values, Other Characteristics, and 
Fact Perceptions on Correct Result 
5. Statistical Tests 
We analyzed the results with several statistical tests. We com-
puted the percentage of subjects defined by their values and by their 
individual characteristics who favored either acquitting or convicting 
the defendants, and the mean scores of subject so identified on the 
verdict scales (BW_Aquit and BC_Acquit). Those results enable us to 
evaluate hypotheses on the overall effects of values and individual 
characteristics on preferred results in the cases.  
We used structural equation modeling (SEM) to test the hy-
pothesized relationship between values, characteristics, fact percep-
tions, and outcome judgments. Combining factor analysis for latent 
variables, linear regression, and path analysis, SEM enables the influ-
ence of independent variables on a dependent variable and on one 
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another to be measured simultaneously.79 As such, it is particularly 
well suited for testing hypothesis that involve mediating relationships 
between latent variables such as attitudes and beliefs.80 We used 
SEM techniques to assess the relative strength of models in which 
values, individual characteristics, and fact perceptions exerted the ef-
fects on one another and on subjects’ outcome judgments predicted 
by the Neutral Umpire Model, the Partisan Value Model, and the 
Self-Defensive Cognition Model, respectiv
Statistical power for the SEM analyses was ample. The size of 
the subsamples was 838 and 772 for the Battered Woman and the 
Battered Commuter conditions, respectively. Accordingly, at a two-
tailed significance criterion of .05, the likelihood of detecting small to 
medium effect sizes (r = .25) was well over 95% for the planned 
SEM analyses.81 Accordingly, nonsignificance findings are not ap-
propriately attributable to type II error.82 
6. Missing Data 
Missing data were modest (< 5% of the values overall). Stochas-
tic regression was used to impute missing values.83 
B. Results 
We report the results in two steps. We start with a summary of 
simple outcome judgments, overall and across subjects of different 
types, in both conditions. We then present, again for both conditions, 
the SEM analyses of the relationship between subjects’ values, their 
fact perceptions and their preferred outcomes. 
 
79 See generally Rebecca Weston & Jr. Paul A. Gore, A Brief Guide to Structural Equa-
tion Modeling, 34 Counseling Psychol. 719 (2006). 
80 See id. at 719-20. 
81 Jacob Cohen, Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences tbls. 2.3.5, 
t3.3.5 (1988). 
82 See generally David L Streiner, Unicorns Do Exist: A Tutorial on “Proving” the Null 
Hypothesis, 48 Canadian J. Psychiatry 756 (2003). 
83 See generally Roderick J.A. Little & Donald B. Rubin, The Analysis of Social-Science 
Data with Missing Values, 18 Social Method Res. 292 (1989). 
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1. Simple Outcome Judgments 
Outcome judgments for each condition are reflected in Table 1. 
The values for “guilty” and “self-def” reflect the percentage of the 
subjects of the specified type who “agreed” either mildly, modestly, 
or strongly with the proposition that the relevant defendant should 
be convicted of murder or acquitted on grounds of self-defense. The 
difference between 100% and the sum of “guilty” and “self-def” re-
flects the percentage of subjects who disagreed with both proposi-
tions, possibly because they believed the defendant should be con-
victed of some crime, just not murder. 
      
 Battered Woman Beleaguered Commuter 
  Guilty Self-Def Guilty Self-Def 
Overall 47% 46%  33% 56% 
Men 50% 44%  34% 54% 
Women 44% 47%  32% 57% 
Whites 48% 44%  29% 61% 
Blacks 41% 42%  56% 32% 
Republicans 51% 40%  24% 66% 
Democrats 43% 49%  39% 50% 
Conservatives 56% 38%  23% 66% 
Liberals 42% 50%  43% 46% 
Hierarchs 51% 40%  23% 67% 
Egalitarians 42% 49%  44% 43% 
Individualists 51% 43%  26% 65% 
Communitarians 43% 48%  40% 45% 
For Battered Woman, n = 838; for Beleaguered Commuter, n = 772. Bold type-
face indicates significant difference (p ≤ .10) between percentages of subjects 
within paired groups “agreeing” with indicated outcome.  
Table 1. Outcome Judgments Overall and by Class of Subject 
Both cases were reasonably controversial overall. Battered 
Woman was especially close, dividing subjects more or less evenly. 
To our surprise, compared to subjects in Battered Woman, subjects 
in Beleaguered Commuter were on the whole considerably more dis-
posed to acquit. Nevertheless, with 44% of the subjects unwilling to 
exonerate the defendant on grounds of self-defense and 33% willing 
to convict him of murder, sentiment for acquittal in Battered Com-
muter was by no means overwhelming. 
Outcome judgments displayed the opposing forms of polariza-
tion. Subjects who identified themselves as “conservatives” or “Re-
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 43 
  
                                                
publicans” were significantly more disposed toward conviction in 
Battered Woman, and toward acquittal in Beleaguered Commuter, 
than were subjects who identified themselves as “liberals” or “De-
mocrats.” Egalitarians and Communitarians were significantly more 
disposed toward conviction in Beleaguered Commuter (although in 
absolute terms they were fairly evenly divided) than were Hierarchs 
and Individualists. Also as predicted, Egalitarians were also signifi-
cantly more disposed toward acquittal than were Hierarchs in Bat-
tered Woman. We were unsure how subjects defined with reference 
to their worldviews along the Individualism-Communitarian dimen-
sion would react in Battered Woman, but it turned out that Individu-
alists were significantly more inclined to convict (although not sig-
nificantly less inclined to acquit on grounds of self-defense). 
The relationship between outcome judgments and other individ-
ual characteristics also matched our predictions. As hypothesized, 
whites were significantly more disposed toward acquittal in Battered 
Commuter than were African-Americans, and men were significantly 
more disposed than women toward conviction in Battered Woman 
(although differences between the two were not significant with re-
spect to acquitting on grounds of self-defense). 
2. SEM Analysis 
SEM analyses were performed separately for both Beleaguered 
Commuter and Battered Woman. In each case, we started by testing 
for adequacy of fitness a model that reflected the hypothesized rela-
tionship between values, individual characteristics, fact perceptions 
and outcome judgments. We then assessed the fit and strength of this 
model in comparison to others that reflected different hypotheses 
about the relationship of these variables. 
SEM analysis features a notoriously wide variety of “goodness of 
fit” indexes.84 The “exact fit” or chi-square (χ2) test is the most 
common one, but is known to generate a high rate of false rejections 
of adequate models, particularly when sample sizes are even modestly 
large.85 Not surprisingly, every model tested in connection with both 
 
84 See generally Weston & Gore, supra note 79, at 741 
85 See Paul Barrett, Structural Equation Modeling: Adjudging Model Fit, 42 Personality & 
Individual Differences 815 (2007) (“Mathematically, this occurs as the sample size 
is a ‘multiplier’ of the discrepancy function in the exact-fit test. In general, the lar-
ger the sample size, the more likely a model will fail to fit via using the χ2 goodness 
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the Beleaguered Commuter (n = 772) and Battered Woman (n = 838) 
failed the χ2 test. “Researchers have addressed the χ2 limitations by 
developing goodness-of-fit indexes that take a more pragmatic ap-
proach to the evaluation process.”86 We selected as our pragmatic 
goodness-of-fit tests that have been deemed especially suitable for 
large-sample studies of latent personality and related traits in social 
psychology:87 (1) relative chi-square (χ2/df) < 5; (2) standardized root 
mean square residual (SRMR) ≤ .08; and (3) root mean square error 
of approximation (RMSEA) ≤ .08.88 
a. Beleaguered Commuter analyses. Figure 5 displays the model con-
structed to test the hypotheses generated by the Self-Defensive Cog-
nition Model as applied to Beleaguered Commuter. The only direct 
influence on outcome judgments (“Acquittal,” as measured by the 
latent variable, BC_Acquittal) is subjects’ perceptions of the facts 
(“Pro-Dfdt Fact Perceptions,” as measured by the latent variable 
BC_Facts).89 Subjects’ partisan values (reflected in the ideology and 
party affiliation measures and the latent cultural worldview variables) 
influence their outcome judgments only indirectly through the influ-
 
of fit test.”); Sik-Yum Lee, Structural Equation Modeling: a Bayesian Approach 
111 (2007) (“As pointed out in the statistic literature there are problems associated 
with [χ2],” which rejects models “too frequently with large sample sizes.” (citations 
omitted); Barbara M. Byrne, Structural Equation Modeling with AMOS: Basic 
Concepts, Applications, and Programming 81 (2001) (“Thus, findings of well-
fitting hypothesized models, where the χ2 approximates the degrees of freedom, 
have proven to be unrealistic in most SEM empirical research.”) 
86 Byrne, supra note85, at 81. 
87 See André Beauducel & Werner W. Wittmann, Simulation Study on Fit Indexes in 
CFA Based on data with Slightly Distorted Simple Structure, 12 Structural Equation Mod-
eling 41, 73 (2005) (concluding that of simulation study that “a model evaluation 
strategy that focuses on RMSEA, SRMR, and perhaps the χ2/df values . . . for psy-
chometric research on personality traits and for other areas of psychology”). 
88 See Li-tze Hu & Peter M. Bentler, Cutoff Criteria for Fit Indexes in Covariance Struc-
ture Analysis: Conventional Criteria versus New Alternatives, 6 Structural Equation Mod-
eling 1 (1999); Matthew Thomson, Deborah J. MacInnis & C Whan Park, The Ties 
That Bind: Measuring the Strength of Consumers' Emotional Attachments to Brands, 15 J. 
Consumer Psychol. 77 (2005). 
89 Consistent with convention, observed variables are represented by rectangles, 
while unobserved or latent variables are represented by ovals. See Weston & Gore, 
supra note 79, tbl. 1. The observed variables from which the latent variables are 
derived (via factor analysis) are omitted for ease of display. See supra Part II.A.3 
(describing measures used to construct latent variables). 
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ence of their values on the perceptions of the facts. The model fit the 
data adequately under each of the selected fitness indexes. 
Black
Other
Minority
Female
Conservative v. 
Liberal
Republican v. 
Democrat
Independent v. 
Democrat
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism
Individualism v.
Communitarianism
BC_Facts BC_Acquit
+
-
-
+
+
+
R2 = .88R2 = .25
+
Education Married UrbanIncome
- -
χ2 /df = 4.7
SRMR = .08
RMSEA = .07
Fit Statistics:
>.5
>.25
>.15
<.15
ns (p ≤ .10)
Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s
Sign: +/-
Figure 5. “Self-Defensive Cognition” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition 
The size and significance of the path coefficients (represented in 
the form of a multivariate regression Table 2) enable the impact of 
various influences on pro-defendant factual perceptions to be disen-
tangled and compared. Consistent with our hypotheses, Hierarchy-
Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarianism both inclined 
subjects to form a pro-defendant view. Indeed, these variables had 
the largest impacts, respectively, of all the influences on factual per-
ceptions. Conservativism also weakly predicted a pro-defendant view 
of the facts, but interestingly, party membership did not generate any 
significant effect once other influences were controlled for.  
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 Standardized Beta Weights 
Female   .059* 
Black   -.108*** 
Other Minority   -.068** 
Income   .000 
Education   -.106*** 
Urban   -.036 
Married   -.083** 
Hierarchy   .270*** 
Individualism   .172*** 
Conservativism   .075* 
Republican   .003 
Independent    .035  
R2    .25   
n = 772. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variable is BC_Facts. 
Table 2. Influences on Pro-Defendant Fact Perceptions in Beleaguered Commuter 
After Hierarchy and Individualism, the next biggest impact was 
associated with being African-American (rather than white). As ex-
pected, this individual characteristic, which can plausibly be seen as 
influencing cognition of facts either as a proxy for group-held values 
or as a proxy for experiences unrelated to values, negatively influ-
enced subjects’ views of the pro-defendant facts. Gender, another 
characteristic that could influence cognition either through its corre-
lation with self-defining values or its correlation with experiences, 
weakly predicted a pro-defendant view of the facts.  
Two influences that are seemingly unrelated to values also af-
fected perceptions of the facts. One of these was education: the more 
educated subjects were (holding all other influences constant), the 
more likely they were to form a view of the facts hostile to the defen-
dant’s case. The other was marital status, which likewise (modestly) 
inclined subjects toward a pro-conviction view of the facts. Income 
had no effect. Nor did residing in an urban community. 
Figure 6 depicts a model constructed to test the relationship be-
tween variables associated with the Neutral Umpire Model. In it, only 
characteristics that arguably exert influence independently of values 
are treated as affecting fact perceptions, which are themselves treated 
as the only influence on outcome judgments. Precisely because it 
takes no account of subjects’ values, this model explains over 60% 
less of the variance in subjects’ fact perceptions (R2 = .09) relative to 
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the previous one (R2 = .25). The model also displayed poor relative 
fit (SRMR = .10). Overall, then, for Beleaguered Commuter a model 
that reflects Neutral Umpire hypothesis does not supply as convinc-
ing an account of the relationships observed in the data as one that 
reflects the Self-Defensive Cognition account. 
Black
Other
Minority
Female
Education Married Urban
Income
Conservative v. 
Liberal
Republican v. 
Democrat
Independent v. 
Democrat
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism
Individualism v.
Communitarianism
Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions Acquittal
>.5
>.25
>.15
<.15
ns (p ≤ .10)
Path Coefficients
Standardized ß’s
Sign: +/-
-
-
-
+
R2 = .88R2 = .09
χ2 /df = 4.8
SRMR = .10
RMSEA = .07
Fit Statistics:
 
Figure 6. “Neutral Umpire” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition 
The same is true for a model that reflects the relationships pos-
ited by the Partisan Value position. As depicted in Figure 7, that 
model treats self-defining values (including characteristics with which 
such values might correlate) as influencing outcome judgments di-
rectly, without mediation by fact perceptions, which are themselves 
deemed to have no effect. That model also does not satisfy the speci-
fied fix indexes (χ2/df = 5.3; SRMR = .11). Failing to take account of 
the influence of subjects’ fact perceptions reduces the power of this 
model to explain outcome judgments by over 67% (R2 = .20) relative 
to the two previous models (R2 = .88). Interestingly, once the impact 
of Hierarchy (ß = .297; p < .001) and Individualism (ß = .142, 
p = .02) are taken into account, neither conservative-liberal ideology 
(ß = .044, p = .36) nor Republican-Democrat party affiliation (ß = -
.018, p = .69) has any significant impact on outcome judgments. 
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Liberal
Republican v. 
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+
+
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Education Married UrbanIncome
 
Figure 7. “Partisan Value” SEM Model in Beleaguered Commuter Condition 
As we hypothesized, a model based on the Self-Defensive Cog-
nition position fits the data better than ones based on the Neutral 
Umpire and Partisan Value positions. But as is almost always true in 
SEM analyses, it remains possible to construct numerous models in 
addition to the hypothesized ones that also satisfy the utilized criteria 
of fitness. These models, in which values (and characteristics correlat-
ing with values) are treated as influencing outcome judgments both 
directly and indirectly, essentially involve hybrid combinations of the 
Self-Defensive Cognition and Partisan Value positions. Fully testing 
our hypotheses requires a comparison of the adequacy of the Self-
Defensive Cognition model reflected in Figure 5 and these other 
ones.90 
A technique employing the Bayesian Information Criterion 
(BIC) was used to perform such a test. BIC is one approach to Bayes-
ian model testing, which computes the odds that any particular model 
                                                 
90 See generally Adrian E. Raftery, Bayesian Model Selection in Social Research, 25 Socio-
logical Methodology 111, 113, 120-21 (1995) (describing as “arbitrary” the com-
mon practice of accepting an hypothesized model that adequately fits data without 
evaluating it relative to others that also adequately fit and that generate “different 
answers to the main questions of interest”). 
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better explains the data than another within a specified set of mod-
els.91 BIC uses an algorithm that initially assigns all models an equal 
likelihood of being the best fitting and that thereafter updates its es-
timations in light of the relative fit of each model compared to that of 
every other one.92 In our BIC analysis, we compared the model de-
picted in Figure 5 to the 255 potential alternative models formed 
when the 8 variables representing subjects values (Hierarchy, Indi-
vidualism, Conservativism, Republican, and Independent, as well as 
Black, Other Minority, and Female) were treated as potentially influ-
encing not just factual perceptions but also outcome judgments, ei-
ther uniquely or in combination with one or more of the others.93  
Black
Other
Minority
Female
Education Married UrbanIncome
Conservative v. 
Liberal
Republican v. 
Democrat
Independent v. 
Democrat
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism
Individualism v.
Communitarianism
Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions
Acquittal
Posited
TestedPaths
 
Figure 8. Posited Relationships and Tested Alternatives in Beleaguered Commuter BIC 
Analysis 
This analysis indicated that the model in Figure 5 was the most 
likely of the tested models to be the best fitting one. The odds that 
that model was the best-fitting were greater than 3:1—the cutoff 
                                                 
91 See Lee, supra note 85, at 113-15, 127-28. 
92 See Raftery, supra note 90, at 111, 130-33, 137-38. 
93 The total number of possible models when each of the eight value-related vari-
ables can be individually included or excluded is 28 or 256. 
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conventionally deemed to furnish “positive” proof that the less plau-
sible model should be rejected94—for every alternative except one. 
That one, which had a BIC score of 1.13 (approximately 2.1:1 against 
being a better fit), was identical to the one in Figure 5 except that it 
treated the variable “Independent vs. Democrat” as influencing out-
come judgments both directly as well as indirectly through its impact 
on fact perceptions. The effects associated with this variable were 
small (ß = .060, p = .10, for BC_Facts; ß = -.067, p = .02, for 
BC_Acquittal). In addition, the signs were opposed to one another. 
The meaning of this result is complex: essentially, subjects who de-
scribed themselves as Democrats were (all else equal) slightly less in-
clined to have a pro-defendant view of the facts, yet controlling for pro-
defendant fact perceptions more inclined toward acquittal, than ones who 
described themselves as independents. Far from undermining the 
proposition that self-defensive cognition explains political division in 
the Beleaguered Commuter case, this result suggests that more than 
100% of the disposition of Democrats to convict relative to inde-
pendents is mediated by the influence of being a self-described De-
mocrat on subjects’ values on their cognition of facts. On the whole, 
though, it would seem unsound to assign much significance to this 
statistical quirk, particularly given that the most meaningful political 
divisions in Beleaguered Commuter are between Democrats and Re-
publicans, not Democrats and independents. 
b. Battered woman. To analyze the data in the Battered Woman 
condition, we again constructed models that would allow us to assess 
the relationships among variables of interest associated with the Self-
Defensive Cognition, the Neutral Umpire, and the Partisan Value 
positions. The models utilized the Battered Woman fact perception 
and outcome judgment variables (BW_Facts and BW_Acquittal, re-
spectively) but were otherwise identical to those depicted in Figures 
5-7. We again found that the Self-Defensive Cognition model ade-
quately fit the data (χ2/df = 4.7; SRMR = .08; RMSEA = .07). Parti-
san Value again did not (χ2/df = 5.4; SRMR = .09; RMSEA = .07). 
But this time Neutral Umpire also did (χ2/df = 4.7; SRMR = .08; 
RMSEA = .07). 
Not surprisingly, it was possible to construct various other, non-
hypothesized models that combined various elements of these three 
that also adequately fit the data. Accordingly, to assess the relative 
 
94 See Raftery, supra note 90, Tbl. 6. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 Self-Defensive Cognition of Self-Defense 51 
  
plausibility of these various models, we again performed a BIC analy-
sis. Models that contemplated various combinations of values influ-
encing outcome judgments either directly or indirectly were again in-
cluded in the testing set. But this time so were models that contem-
plated that none of the value measures would have any effect what-
soever on outcome judgments, the relationship asserted by the Neu-
tral Umpire Position. The tested combinations of relationships, 
which formed 8,192 discrete models, are reflected in Figure 9. 
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Education Married UrbanIncome
Conservative v. 
Liberal
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Democrat
Hierarchy v.
Egalitarianism
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Communitarianism
Pro-Dfdt Fact
Perceptions
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Posited
TestedPaths
 
Figure 9. Posited Relationships and Tested Alternatives in Battered Woman BIC 
Analysis 
The model deemed most likely to be the best fitting one is dis-
played in Figure 10. Inconsistent with the Neutral Umpire position 
but consistent with the Self-Defensive Cognition position, variables 
unambiguously associated with subjects’ values—namely, the Hierar-
chy-Egalitarian measure of worldview, and liberalism-conservati-
vism—influence subjects’ positions, and do so indirectly through 
their effect on subjects’ pro-defense perception of the facts. These 
effects are large, relative to other influences. The Individualism-
Communitarianism dimension of worldview does not affect subjects’ 
fact perceptions, a result not unexpected, given the ambiguity of the 
social meaning of Battered Woman relative to this constellation of 
norms. Nor does party affiliation. As expected, gender has a positive 
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effect on subjects’ factual perceptions. So does being married. Educa-
tion has a weak negative effect. 
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Figure 10. Most Probable Best-Fitting Model in Battered Woman 
Although it posits that fact perceptions strongly explains varia-
tion in outcome judgments, the model explains only a modest 
amount of the variation in subjects’ fact perceptions (R2 = .08). Its 
explanatory power in this regard is about one-third as large of that of 
the Beleaguered Commuter in Figure 5 (R2 = .25). Absent a plausible 
conjecture as to how any omitted variables might correlate to the ob-
served ones, however, there is no reason to doubt that the model ac-
curately captures the influence of, and relationship between, the vari-
ables deemed to influence fact perceptions.95 
                                                 
95 See Jacob Cohen, Patricia Cohen, Stephen G. West & Leona S. Aiken, Applied 
Multiple Regression/Correlation Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences 143 (3rd ed. 
2003). 
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 Standardized Beta Weights 
Female   .060* 
Black   -.018 
Other Minority   .064* 
Income   -.045 
Education   -.067* 
Urban   -.025 
Married   .092** 
Hierarchy   -.143*** 
Conservativism   -.109** 
R2    .08   
n = 838. *** p ≤ .01, ** p ≤ .05, * p ≤ .10. Dependent variable is 
BW_Facts. 
Table 3. Influences on Pro-Defendant Fact Perceptions in Battered Womanr 
In this model, the Hierarchy-Egalitarian dimension of worldview 
also has a small and significant direct effect (ß = .060, p = .02) on out-
come judgments. This relationship would appear more in keeping 
with the Partisan Value position than with the Self-Defensive Cogni-
tion one. But this appearance is misleading.  
The sign of the direct effect of Hierarchy on outcome judgments 
is positive, the opposite of the larger (ß = -.140, p = .00) indirect effect 
of Hierarchy on pro-defendant fact perceptions. In other words, be-
ing hierarchical, as expected, influences subjects to adopt an anti-
defendant view of the facts in Battered Woman. It also inclines them 
to favor acquittal when factual perceptions are held constant, but this result 
is merely a statistical artifact of the immense size of the mediating 
effect of fact perceptions on hierarchs’ and egalitarians’ positions on 
the Battered Woman case. In effect, the overall effect of a hierarchi-
cal orientation on the disposition to convict the defendant is so 
strongly concentrated on the impact of values on subjects’ fact per-
ceptions that the mediated effect of worldviews explains more than 
100% of the overall variance in the disposition of Egalitarians and 
Hierarchs to acquit her. 
Only one other model tested in the BIC analysis survived the 3:1 
cutoff criterion for positive proof of inadequacy. That model, which 
had a BIC score of .768 (odds of approximately 9:8 against being su-
perior to the model depicted in Figure 10), was identical to the one 
depicted in Figure 10 except that it posited a direct effect between the 
Individualism-Solidarism and outcome judgments. That effect was 
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small and insignificant (ß = -.035, p = .29). The potential superior 
fitness of this model, then, furnishes no meaningful basis for ques-
tioning the basic results of the model depicted in Figure 10. 
C. Discussion 
1. Summary of Results 
The aim of the study was to examine a set of hypotheses sup-
portive of the larger proposition that self-defensive cognition, not 
partisan disregard of facts and controlling law, explain political con-
flict over self-defense cases. The results of the study strongly sup-
ported these hypotheses. 
First, we found, not surprisingly, that cases patterned on the 
iconic battered woman and beleaguered commuter do divide people 
of diverse values. The divisions, moreover, form mirror images of 
each other. In the beleaguered commuter case, persons of egalitarian 
and communitarian worldviews, and persons who describe them-
selves as liberals or Democrats, are more likely to convict than per-
sons of hierarchical and individualist views, and those who describe 
themselves as conservatives or Republicans. In the battered woman 
case, the positions of these sets of persons is reversed. 
Second, we found that the influence that values exert over out-
come judgments is mediated by the impact of the commitments on 
individuals’ perceptions of the facts. Consistent with the self-
defensive cognition hypothesis, the data showed that subjects of dif-
fering values formed opposing views of the key facts (which were 
structured to be largely parallel in both cases). The proposition that 
subjects would favor outcomes that fit their values independently of 
their view of the key facts not supported by the evidence. SEM mod-
els that treated values as influencing outcome judgments directly, inde-
pendently of their influence on fact perceptions, failed to fit the data. 
Models that posited that values could simultaneously influence percep-
tions of facts and outcome judgments suggested that holding fact percep-
tions constant persons of particular commitments were inclined to 
decide cases in the manner that was contrary to the positions associ-
ated with their values—an anomaly that only confirms how decisive 
the contribution of varying fact perceptions is to the political conflict 
actually observed in such cases. 
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Not surprisingly—or unexpectedly—values turned out not to be 
the only influence on our subjects’ fact perceptions. Two others that 
did—race and gender—are themselves recognized to be correlated 
with values (cultural, moral, and otherwise) that are essential to indi-
vidual identity. But at least two other characteristics that mattered—
level of education and marital status—would seem to be connected 
to value-independent experiences that influence the sorts of under-
standings people might use to assess the plausibility of competing 
factual claims in the battered woman and beleaguered commuter 
cases. But none of these individual characteristics had as strong a bear-
ing on subjects’ factual perceptions as the values did. 
Third and finally, we found that cultural worldviews—a species 
of value that is known to motivate identity-protective cognition—
made a relatively large contribution to variance in our subjects’ fac-
tual perceptions. This was especially true in Beleaguered Commuter, 
where Hierarchy-Egalitarianism and Individualism-Communitarian-
ism were the two largest fact-perception influences.  
Hierarchy-Egalitarianism, but not Individualism-Communi-
tarianism, affected fact-perceptions in Battered Woman, once all 
other influences were controlled for. This was not totally unexpected, 
since we were unable to form an unequivocal hypothesis about how 
the Individualism-Communitarianism dimension of worldview would 
dispose subjects to view the actors involved.  
The impact of conventional political commitments was mixed. 
Political party affiliation made no significant contribution to variance 
in fact perceptions in Beleaguered Commuter once other influences 
were controlled for, and did not figure in the best-fitting models in 
Battered Woman. Liberal-conservative ideology made a significant 
but very modest contribution in Beleaguered Commuter after cultural 
worldviews were taken into account. However, in Battered Woman, 
liberal-conservative ideology had a bigger impact, one that ap-
proached that of Hierarchy-Egalitarianism. The performance of lib-
eral-conservative ideology in the analyses bears on the question of 
how important ideology is relative to culture in orienting individuals’ 
understanding of how the world works.96 But because it is not dis-
puted that political ideology can be a source of values essential to in-
dividual identity, the contribution that liberal-conservative ideology 
 
96 See generally Wildavsky, supra note 78; Braman et al., supra note 78. 
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made in this case is perfectly consistent with—indeed unambiguously 
supportive of—our primary claim: that self-defensive cognition is the 
source of political conflict over self-defense cases. 
2. Issues for Future Research 
a. The missing link. The study examined the connection between 
people’s values and their reactions to certain types of self-defense 
cases. Our conclusion was that persons aren’t ignoring facts at odds 
with their preferred outcomes; rather they are psychologically moti-
vated to conform their view of the facts to the outcomes most in 
keeping with their values. 
It should be possible, though, to refine and enrich this picture of 
how values enter into cognition of facts. Self-defensive cognition 
posits that individuals are drawn (subconsciously) to facts supportive 
of their values, particularly ones connected to group commitments. 
But some process must also be occurring that enables subjects to recog-
nize what those facts are.  
One might suspect that subjects are first identifying what result 
they prefer on the basis of their values and then subconsciously 
working backward, as it were, to identify and find support for the 
facts that cohere with that outcome. Because it accepts that individu-
als end up honestly believing that the outcome they support is dic-
tated by facts independent of their values, this “confirmation bias”97 
thesis would move persons of diverse values to disagree on politically 
controversial cases in patterns consistent with those of self-defensive 
cognition thesis.  
Nevertheless, we suspect the confirmation bias does not accu-
rately capture the psychological experience of persons evaluating self-
defense cases like the ones featured in this study. That is, we doubt 
that persons self-consciously identify the outcome they prefer before 
they look at the facts in the case; we imagine, at least, that they per-
ceive themselves to be deferring an outcome judgment until after they 
have consulted the facts in a manner that comports with neutral deci-
sionmaking. If so, then something other than a “peek” at the result 
 
97 See generally C. R. Mynatt, M. E. Doherty & R. D. Tweney, Confirmation Bias in a 
Simulated Research Environment--Experimental-Study of Scientific Inference, 29 Q.J. Exp 
Psychol. 85 (1977). 
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must nevertheless be making them converge on facts congenial to 
their values. What might that other influence be? 
We can think of two related ones. The first is social meaning. The 
Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter vignettes likely evoke 
competing sets of culturally resonant symbols—of the historic deni-
gration of social prerogatives within the home; of heroic opposition 
to entrenched forms of patriarchy; of the breakdown of legitimate 
social order and a righteous attempt to reverse the same; of the im-
position of racial dominance; of virtuous self-reliance; of the dispar-
agement of nonviolent, reasoned self-governance. Which of these 
symbols the fact patterns evoke in individuals and their evaluation of 
them—matters strongly conditioned by individuals’ self-defining val-
ues—dispose individuals to adopt corresponding views of the facts.98 
Another possible link between values and fact perceptions is af-
fect. Contemporary work in psychology and neuro-science suggests 
that emotions play a critical role—a preverbal one, not reproducible 
by reflective or deductive reasoning—in enabling individuals to per-
ceive what states of affairs, and what stances toward them, best ex-
press their values.99 Mark Alicke, the originator of the “culpable con-
trol” model of blame attribution, posits that affective responses to 
norm-violative behavior guide individuals’ cognition of the existence 
of factual predicates of blame.100 Work on the cultural cognition of 
risk suggest that affective judgments enable the same expressively 
rational stance taking when individuals form factual judgments about 
putatively dangerous activities.101 It seems plausible that individuals 
who encounter facts like those in the Battered Woman and Belea-
 
98 See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group Influence on 
Political Beliefs, 85 J. Personality & Soc. Psych. 808 (2003) (finding support for me-
diating influence of social meanings on effects of in-group affinity on belief forma-
tion). 
99 See generally Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain (1994); Martha Craven Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intel-
ligence of the Emotions (2001). 
100 See Alicke, supra note 51, at 558. 
101 See Dan M. Kahan, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, Penn. L. Rev. 
(forthcoming 2008); Ellen M. Peters, Burt Burraston & C. K. Mertz, An Emotion-
Based Model of Risk Perception and Stigma Susceptibility: Cognitive Appraisals of Emotion, 
Affective Reactivity, Worldviews, and Risk Perceptions in the Generation of Technological 
Stigma, 24 Risk Analysis 1349 (2004). 
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guered Commuter vignette are likewise forming affective judgments, 
themselves conditioned by their values, that guide them to adopt 
views of the facts that best express their defining commitments. 
Indeed, social meaning and affect might well work in tandem. 
That is, the immediate symbolic connotations that such cases evoke 
in persons of diverse values themselves trigger or become the objects 
of emotions that then dispose individuals toward value-supportive 
views of the facts. 
These hypotheses, too, are worthy of study. Appropriately de-
signed experiments could assess what contribution, if any, confirma-
tion bias, social meaning, and affect play within the perception of 
facts in controversial self-defense cases. Such studies would not only 
help to validate, and extend understanding of, the function of self-
defensive cognition in this setting. It might also furnish insights on 
forms of structuring information about such cases that counteracts 
the influence of self-defensive cognition—assuming counteracting it 
is in fact an appropriate end.102 
b. Deliberation. Each subject in our study assessed on her own the 
facts of the self-defense case that she was assigned to decide. In the 
real world, individuals tend to evaluate facts like these in groups, 
whether as members of juries deciding cases or citizens debating 
whether jury verdicts are sound. Adding elements of deliberation 
would be a worthwhile way to extend the research carried out in our 
study. 
In fact, the impact of deliberation on legal and political deci-
sionmaking has already been subject to extensive assessment. Certain 
forms of highly structured group discussion appear sometimes to 
mute disagreements on policy matters.103 But most forms of delib-
eration, including ones that occur in real-world legal settings, have 
exactly the opposite effect. The phenomenon of “group polarization” 
refers to the tendency of individuals to adopt progressively more ex-
treme views as they exchange views on disputed issues.104 The effect 
is particularly acute when members of diverse groups deliberate, re-
 
102 See text at notes 139-140. 
103 See Bruce A. Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day (2004). 
104 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. Pol. Phil. 175 
(2002).. 
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sulting, typically, in highly uniform views within such groups and 
highly opposed ones across them.105 
It’s unlikely that a study of deliberation in politically controver-
sial self-defense cases would generate different results. Nevertheless, 
adding deliberation to a study like the one we performed could prof-
itably be used to examine at least two issues. 
One would be the comparative effects of deliberation on jury 
verdicts, on the one hand, and public reactions to jury verdicts, on 
the other. Left to their own devices, individuals tend to expose them-
selves to information sources (whether media outlets, authority fig-
ures, or peers) that share their own cultural and ideological out-
looks.106 This disposition can be expected systematically to magnify 
political and cultural polarization. Jurors, in contrast, discuss matters 
in relatively small groups whose membership they cannot influence; 
individuals deliberating under such circumstances continue to migrate 
toward extremes,107 but the orienting signal of culture or ideology is 
necessarily diluted for them. It’s conceivable that this effect explains 
why juries, even relatively diverse ones, might converge with relative 
ease on unanimous verdicts that nevertheless generate intense politi-
cal divisions in the public at large. Such a finding would be relevant 
to assessing the often-asserted importance of juries in gaining accept-
ability for or “legitimizing” potentially controversial outcomes. 
Including deliberation in the study of controversial self-defense 
cases would also allow investigation of potential responses to the ef-
fects of self-defensive cognition. Empirical work in other settings has 
suggested techniques that can mitigate the disposition of individuals 
to resist information that threatens their values.108 If mitigation of 
the effects of self-defensive cognition is deemed socially desirable, 
experimental studies could be designed to determine how that objec-
 
105 See generally See generally David Schkade, Cass R. Sunstein & Reid Hastie, What 
Happened on Deliberation Day?, 95 Cal. L. Rev. 915 (2007) (demonstrating effect ex-
perimentally); Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling 
Facts, Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 Soc. J. Res. 283-304 (2005) (simula-
tions of this effect). 
106 See id. 
107 See Sunstein, supra note 104. 
108 See Cohen, et al. Partisan Divide,” , supra note 3; Cohen, et al., Affirming the Self, 
supra note 3. 
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tive might be pursued, both in the jury room and in the town square. 
Whether society ought to view self-defensive cognition as a phenome-
non worthy of neutralization in the resolution and evaluation of con-
troversial criminal cases, and if so what sorts of interventions might 
have that effect, are matters we take up in the next Part of this paper.  
III. THE SELF-DEFENSIVE COGNITION OF SELF-
DEFENSE: AN APPRAISAL 
Our study considered the wide-spread perception that partisan 
values account for popular controversy over self-defense cases. They 
do, our results suggest, but in a way that defies the dominant aca-
demic versions of this claim. There’s every reason to believe that citi-
zens of diverse moral and cultural persuasions are faithfully applying 
the doctrine; it’s the unperceived cognitive impact of their values on 
their cognition of the facts that induces them to disagree on what 
those criteria entail in particular cases.  
We now want to consider the moral and practical significance of 
the self-defensive cognition of self-defense. Is the influence of indi-
viduals self-defining values on their perceptions of facts in self-
defense cases something to be concerned about? If so, what, if any-
thing, can be done? 
A. Is There a Problem? Self-Defensive Cognition Meets Cognitive Illiberalism 
As we’ve discussed, both popular and scholarly debate over self-
defense has been consumed with the conflict between the Neutral 
Umpire and Partisan Value Models. Abuse-excuse critics lament the 
subversion of the former by the latter. New Normativists complain 
only about the reluctance of decisionmakers and commentators to 
acknowledge the dominance of the Partisan Value position so that 
members of the public can see and react to the contribution con-
tested visions of the good can make to the law.109 
We can imagine how those on both sides of this dispute might 
in fact welcome the finding that self-defensive cognition is at work in 
controversial self-defense cases. Abuse-excuse critics—or at least 
those who are dismayed by their indictment of the law—might be 
relieved to learn that citizens (legal decisionmakers and those who 
react to what decisionmakers have done) aren’t in fact putting their 
 
109 See supra text at notes 36-50. 
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partisan commitments ahead of the law’s impartial commands but 
instead are judging based on their honest perception of the facts. To 
be sure, citizens of diverse values disagree about the facts. But honest 
disagreements of fact are hardly extraordinary and aren’t normally 
understood to pose a threat to the law’s legitimacy. It’s enough, one 
might think, that citizens, sincerely try to be impartial; no sensible 
conception of neutrality in law could require that impartially moti-
vated citizens always come to the same conclusions. 
New Normativists might also take heart in the contribution of 
self-defensive cognition to disputes over self-defense. They perceive 
in the law’s focus on facts (ones relating dangerousness, volition, and 
the like) a design to conceal the impact of partisan values. But the phe-
nomenon of self-defensive cognition complicates the fact-value dis-
tinction. Citizens who react to media and other popular depictions of 
battered women and beleaguered commuter cases (not to mention 
law students who react to judicial opinions featuring them) can only 
speculate about what was going on in the minds of the parties in-
volved or what would have transpired had the defendant not resorted 
to deadly force. Even jurors who sit in judgment in such cases have 
no direct access to evidence of such matters. Individuals draw on 
their own common sense to form judgments on these issues; yet it 
turns out their sense of how the world works turns primarily on 
shared understandings of how it should. Charting the impact of self-
defensive cognition promotes the New Normativist agenda of moral 
transparency by revealing factual conflict to be just another way we 
contest competing understanding of the good life through law. 
But we are much less sanguine. The basis of our anxiety about 
self-defensive cognition is the phenomenon of cognitive illiberalism.110 
Cognitive illiberalism refers to the tendency of individuals to con-
form their perceptions of how risky or harmful putatively dangerous 
behavior is to their cultural or moral evaluations of that behavior. It 
can be viewed as a distinctive bias in moral reasoning for persons who 
believe the law should eschew the enforcement of a partisan moral 
orthodoxy and confine itself to the promotion of secular ends agree-
able to persons of diverse moral and cultural persuasions.111 
 
110 See Kahan, supra note 5. 
111 See id. 
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We think the possible reactions we’ve attributed to abuse-excuse 
critics and New Normativists fail to recognize that the self-defensive 
cognition is, in this context at least, a species of cognitive illiberalism. 
By way of response to these positions, we’ll present two points that 
reflect this theme. One relates to how self-defensive cognition likely 
disappoints the ends of individuals who desire to judge impartially, 
and the other to how this phenomenon defeats society’s ends in 
reaching legitimate outcomes in self-defense cases that respect the 
cultural and moral identities of its citizens. 
1. Individual Judgments: Values or Blunders? 
The normative status of beliefs formed through self-defensive 
cognition is a complicated issue. Those beliefs are factual in nature 
and relate, typically, to personal and societal dangers (the impact of 
climate change, the hazards of gun ownership, the effects of illegal 
drug distribution, etc.). They derive, however, from individuals’ de-
fining values, which motivate them to resolve factual ambiguities in a 
way that supports conclusions favorable to activities and social roles 
vital to their identities.112 Of course, the idea that reality is as one 
wishes it to be is not a very reliable guide for action; it can indeed be 
viewed as a form of cognitive error.113 For that reason, one might 
conclude there is little reason for persons who hold such beliefs, 
much less others they have entrusted to make decisions about how 
best to secure their safety and well-being, to view them as worthy of 
any particular deference or respect.114 
While not simply wrong, this account is, in our view, too simple. 
Self-defensive cognition, like dynamics of cultural cognition generally, 
is not perfectly analogous to, say, “base rate neglect,” “overgenerali-
zation,” “extremeness aversion,” “the gamblers fallacy,” and various 
other forms of cognitive bias.115 These dynamics are manifestations 
 
112 Kahan et al., supra note 59. 
113 See Jon Elster, Alchemies of the Mind: Rationality and the Emotions 20-21 
(1999) (describing how “wishful thinking” borne of cognitive-dissonance avoid-
ance can “lead[] to false beliefs about the world, . . . [the] acting [on which] can 
have bad consequences”). 
114 See Cass R. Sunstein, Misfearing: A Reply, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1110, 1111 (2006) 
(making this argument about factual beliefs that arise from cultural cognition). 
115 See generally Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Daniel Kah-
neman, Amos Tversky, & Paul Slovic eds., 1982). 
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of “bounded rationality”; they reflect ubiquitous limits on the power 
of individuals to process information in a way that promotes their 
well-being.116 Individuals don’t identify with these constraints on 
their computational acumen; they regret them. As a result, they might 
indeed welcome the intervention of others—perhaps expert risk 
regulators—who posses the training, technology, and resources nec-
essary to make decisions undistorted by these influences. Self-
defensive cognition, in contrast, is a product of our attachment to 
our most deeply held values. Whatever their influence on our cogni-
tion, we would never disown them; they are integral to our sense of 
who we are. When an expert regulator or another acting on our be-
half decides to afford no weight to such beliefs, she is necessarily 
leaving out of her decisionmaking framework a vital element of our 
agency.117 
But that doesn’t mean, we’d argue, that beliefs that are the prod-
uct of self-defensive cognition should invariably be viewed as norma-
tive for our decisions or the decisions of those who represent us. Ac-
tion based on those beliefs, if they are in error, might have noxious 
consequences that the person holding those beliefs would herself 
view as unacceptable. In addition, indulging those beliefs just because 
they derive from values might offend other values the person holds, 
including ones that relate to whether the sorts of values that have given 
rise to the belief in question are proper sources of guidance for 
law.118  
To sort out these complexities, we’d propose that the entitle-
ment of such beliefs to moral respect be tested by asking this ques-
tion: If the person who held such belief could be shown that it arises 
from self-defensive cognition, how would she feel about it? Again, a 
person who could be shown she’d made a computational error based 
on some dynamic of bounded rationality would repudiate any conclu-
sion that follows from it. She might not do the same, however, for a 
belief that arises from her self-defining values. Cultural individualists, 
for example, tend to believe that private gun ownership reduces 
 
116 See generally Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral 
Economics, 93 Am. Econ. Rev. 1449 (2003). 
117 See Kahan et al., supra note 58, at 1104-06. 
118 See generally Dan M. Kahan & Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluations of Risk: “Values” or 
“Blunders”?, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F. 1110 (2006) (developing this argument) 
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rather than increases crime.119 But if they learned that their disposi-
tion to believe this proposition had been influenced by the cultural 
value they attach to guns and the stake they have in occupying social 
roles that involving owing one, it seems unlikely they would assent 
immediately to a hand gun ban.120 On the contrary, they might be 
relieved to learn that they can rely on their values (likely through the 
mediating influence of emotion121) to identify the position an uncer-
tain factual question that best expresses their cultural commitments. Or 
they might see the cultural values (self-reliance, individual courage, 
freedom, and the like) that motivated them to form that belief as jus-
tifying gun rights whatever the impact of gun ownership might be.  
The critical issue, then, is whether individuals who could be 
shown that their self-defining values had shaped their view of the 
facts in cases like Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter 
would be similarly unshaken in their conclusions about how those 
cases should be decided. We think the answer is no. On the contrary, 
we think they would view it as the distinctive form of bias in moral 
reasoning characteristic of cognitive illiberalism. 
Our position here is based on a mixture of informed speculation 
about how people do feel about the relationship between their values 
and self-defense cases and our own moral view about how they 
should. Our fundamental premise is that most citizens are not (and 
should not be) moral imperialists. They have views—deeply held 
ones—about the nature of the good life. But they by and large accept 
(as they ought to) the fundamental tenet of political liberalism that 
the law should not force their view of the good on others, who 
should be free (subject to laws necessary to secure equal liberty for 
all) to pursue their own understanding of the best way to live.122 
Such individuals, we believe, would perceive that the actors involved 
 
119 See Kahan et al., supra note 59. 
120 Cf. Cultural Cognition Project, What Matters More--Consequences or Meanings?, 
http://research.yale.edu/culturalcognition/index.php?option=content&task=view
&id=104 (reporting finding that 87% of Americans who oppose stronger gun con-
trol laws agree with proposition that “[e]ven if banning handguns would greatly 
reduce crime, it would be wrong for society to forbid law-abiding people from 
owning guns for self-protection.”). 
121 See Kahan, supra note 101. 
122 See generally John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 31-32 (1971); John Stuart Mill, On 
Liberty, 14 (D. Spitz ed., 1975). 
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in controversial self-defense cases—the putative aggressors and the 
putative defenders, alike—are often involved in patterns of living that 
variously gratify and offend contested views of the good life. But they 
would not believe it was appropriate to condition the right to defend 
oneself through violence, or to be protected from violence not rea-
sonably necessary for another’s self-defense, to depend on their own 
particular view. If they believed that, we would have found that that 
Partisan Value Model best explained the results in our study. Instead, 
such individuals would desire to decide such cases according to crite-
ria—the very ones reflect in the dominant doctrine of self-defense—
that make the privilege to defend and the entitled to be protected 
available to all regardless of their cultural or social identities. That’s 
why we found that individuals of all cultural and political persuasions 
do conform their outcome judgments to their perceptions of the facts 
in cases likes Battered Woman and Beleaguered Commuter. 
We think persons who see the task of judging in controversial 
self-defense cases this way would be profoundly disappointed to 
learn that what they perceive the facts to be is itself a product of their 
partisan values. They would not adopt the view—attributed to us at 
the outset to the relieved abuse-excuse critic—that honest efforts at 
impartiality are sufficient to quiet the anxiety of partisan bias in the 
law. These people (our subjects, as we interpret the data from our 
study) want to be neutral umpires; they would be no more heartened 
to learn that their partisan values were exerting secret control over 
their perceptions of the facts than would a real baseball umpire to 
learn that his rooting interest for a particular team was subcon-
sciously subverting his goal to call a fair game. Nor would these indi-
viduals accept the advice of our imagined New Normativist. They 
would not want to be told openly to embrace the values expressed by 
their perception of the facts; they want to be told how, given their 
commitment to the law’s own humanist aspirations, they can learn to 
see the facts in a way that isn’t just a disguised reflection of their vi-
sion of the ideal society. 
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2. Collective Judgments: Accuracy, Legitimacy, and Illiberal Status 
Competition 
Whether or not baseball can handle variance in strike zones 
across umpires,123 it’s clear that what we have called the Neutral 
Umpire Model can tolerate at least some forms of variance in factual 
perceptions among self-defense decisionmakers. The effect and 
weight a legal decisionmakers affords to evidence depends on general 
understandings about how the world works, and those understand-
ings are certain to vary based on all manner of experience—
education, sociodemographic background, significant personal 
events, and the like. Knowing that jurors perceive facts differently 
based on the diversity of their backgrounds doesn’t undermine our 
confidence in verdicts. On the contrary, reliance on the jury helps (it 
is thought) to legitimize verdicts by assuring that the law’s perception 
of facts reflects exactly this diversity in popular understandings of the 
workings of the world.124  
The reaction we attributed to the relieved abuse-excuse critic 
presupposes that conflicting fact perceptions that originate in diverse 
values can be accommodated by the Neutral Umpire Model in exactly 
the same way. In our view, this is not the case. 
To start, whereas the contribution that diverse life experiences 
make to factual perceptions arguably enhances rational decisionmak-
ing, the contribution made by self-defensive cognition seems to sub-
vert it. A rational decisionmaker will necessarily draw on all the in-
formation her experiences afford her. She’ll also revise her beliefs in 
light of new experiences, including exposure to other persons who 
have different backgrounds and hence different interpretations of 
ambiguous evidence.125 This is not how individuals reason when they 
are laboring under the influence of self-defensive cognition, however. 
 
123 See Nick Cafardo, Ortiz: It’s No Ball Figuring out What Is a Strike, Boston Globe, 
Apr. 6, 2006, at D13 (“With the help of Red Sox video coordinator Billy Broad-
bent, Ortiz put together a video of all the pitches he took for strikes last season, 
and he said he was stunned by some of the pitches umpires called strikes, some of 
which the designated hitter claims were way out of the zone.”). 
124 See, e.g., Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 529-30 (1975) (“the requirement of a 
jury’s being chosen from a fair cross section of the community” enables the jury to 
promotes “public confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system”). 
125 See generally Howard Raiffa, Decision Analysis: Introductory Lectures on 
Choices Under Uncertainty (1968). 
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In that situation, they selectively attend to information based on its 
congeniality to identity-affirming beliefs and construe ambiguous 
evidence in a way that confirms their identity-affirming priors. They 
also reject as non-credible information that unequivocally threatens 
those beliefs, particularly when they come from people they perceive 
as holding contrary values or group identities.126 As a result, differ-
ences of factual perceptions founded on diversity of values would 
seem to pose a much greater threat to accuracy in outcome judgments 
than differences founded in diversity of life experiences. 
Equally important, differences in such perceptions would also 
pose a much bigger threat to the law’s legitimacy. The political ac-
ceptability of law depends on its power to assure disparately situated 
citizens that the law’s judgments have been arrived at in a way that 
takes their interests and identities into account. There seems little rea-
son to believe that differences in factual beliefs founded on citizens’ 
diverse backgrounds will erode that power, particularly given the exis-
tence of institutions—like juries and popularly elected legislatures—
designed (it’s thought) to pool and aggregate the insights furnished by 
citizens’ collective experiences.127  
But factual disagreements based on self-defensive cognition are 
another matter. Those sorts of disagreements, again, are much more 
likely to survive, and even deepen, over the course of deliberation.128  
What’s more, precisely because such beliefs bear such an inti-
mate connection to citizens’ identities, the law is much more likely to 
inflict a deep sense of resentment and alienation in the losers when it 
picks sides on these issues than it does when it take a position on 
other types of facts citizens disagree with. The reason has to do with 
 
126 See Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, in Barriers 
to Conflict Resolution 27 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds., 1995). 
127 On juries, see, for example, Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury: The Jury System 
and the Ideal of Democracy 11 (1994) (“Long ago, Aristotle suggested that democ-
racy's chief virtue was the way it permitted ordinary persons drawn from different 
walks of life to achieve a ‘collective wisdom’ that none could achieve alone. At its 
best, the jury is the last, best refuge of this connection among democracy, delibera-
tion, and the achievement of wisdom by ordinary persons.”). On legislatures, see, 
for example, John Gastil, By Popular Demand 113 (2000) (defending “deliberative 
discussion” as “creat[ing] more educated and active citizens and reveal[ing] popular 
and effective solutions to pressing national and local problems”).  
128 See supra notes 104-105. 
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another psychological dynamic: naïve realism. Ordinary people, social 
psychologists have documented, can readily perceive that the factual 
beliefs of their opponents in political debate derive from the conge-
niality of those beliefs with the latter’s’ self-defining values and group 
commitments. In this sense, ordinary people are realists. What makes 
them simultaneously naïve is their inability to detect that their own fac-
tual beliefs have the same source.129 Because it induces reciprocal 
charges of stupidity and dishonesty, naïve realism generates an at-
mosphere of distrust, which reinforces the disposition of citizens to 
accept the arguments of persons who hold cultural allegiances differ-
ent from their own. It also heightens everyone’s sense of identity-
threat: in a deliberative climate in which citizens are conspicuously 
divided along cultural and moral lines, and in which each insists the 
others’ position is the product of bad-faith or lack of reason, citizens 
of all persuasions converge on the understanding that what’s being ad-
judicated is not merely an issue of fact, but rather the relative social 
competence and status of those who hold competing sets of defining 
values.130 
This distinctive form of status competition between groups of 
contending worldviews is in fact endemic in our political life. The real 
“culture wars” in the United States are not over values but over facts. 
Polls show that most citizens actually care less about highly charged 
cultural issues like gay marriage or the pledge of allegiance than about 
straightforward instrumental ones relating to their health, safety, and 
economic well-being.131 Nevertheless, the latter types of issues inevi-
tably turn on disputed facts—is the climate heating up and are hu-
mans the source? do gun control laws increase crime or reduce it? 
does the minimum wage raise the standard of living of poor Ameri-
cans are increase unemployment? will vaccinating young girls for 
HPV actually undermine their health by inducing them to engage in 
unprotected sex and thus contract HIV?— on which peoples’ posi-
tions are conspicuously associated with holding one or another com-
peting set of cultural values.132 Through the self-reinforcing interac-
 
129 See Robinson et al., supra note 6. 
130 See Kahan, supra note 5. 
131 See generally Morris P. Fiorina, Samuel J. Abrams & Jeremy C. Pope, Culture 
War? The Myth of a Polarized America (2005). 
132 See Kahan, supra note 5. See generally Wildavsky, supra note 78. 
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tion of naïve realism and identity threat, seemingly instrumental pol-
icy debates transmute into bitter contests to capture the expressive 
power of law to affirm the status and virtue of one culturally defined 
group over its adversaries. This is the central collective pathology of 
cognitive illiberalism.133 
This pathology extends to the adjudication of cases like those of 
the battered woman and the beleaguered commuter. As a result of 
self-defensive cognition, we adopt the view of the facts in such caes 
that affirms our identities. As a result of naïve realism, we react with 
incredulity to professed opposing beliefs of persons who we know 
hold alternative values—and with resentment toward the incredulity 
those persons profess toward our beliefs.134 In the face of these re-
ciprocal recriminations, we and they inevitably come to share the un-
derstanding that what’s being adjudicated, at least in the court of pub-
lic opinion, is not merely the “facts” of particular cases but the hon-
esty, intelligence, virtue, and ultimately the status of groups of per-
sons defined by their commitment to particular views of the good. 
It’s precisely the amenability of controversial cases to this interpreta-
tion that makes them so conspicuous and contro
In the end, we do not disagree at all with the New Normativist 
who draws the conclusion from self-defensive cognition that fact 
claims are just another of the idioms citizens use to contest the nature 
of the good life through law. We only dispute, as a descriptive matter, 
that this is what they really want and, as a moral matter, that, as citi-
zens of a liberal democracy, they really should. 
 
133 See Kahan, supra note 5.  
134 In an insightful recent article, Suzanne Goldberg convincingly argues that fac-
tual claims are used to contest the status of social groups in constitutional law. See 
Suzanne Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social Change, and Fact-
Based Adjudication, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1955 (2006). Goldberg suggests that the use 
of empirical claims in that setting is strategic, enabling judges to conceal reliance on 
partisan norms. The results of our experiment suggest that this phenomenon might 
have a cognitive source: as a result of self-defensive cognition, judges are disposed 
to credit or discredit empirical rationalizations for contested laws depending on 
whether those claims cohere with the judges’ cultural orientations. Consistent with 
naïve realism, moreover, judges can be expected to denounce fellow jurists who 
disagree with them for “departing from [their] role . . . as neutral” arbiters and 
“tak[ing] sides in the culture war,” Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting), without appreciating how their own judgments are shaped by 
their own cultural commitments. 
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B. What to Do? 
As difficult as it is to unearth the influence of self-defensive 
cognition on perceptions of self-defense, and as challenging as assess-
ing its normative implications might be, identifying an effective 
means for counteracting this dynamic is all the more daunting. There is 
one prescriptive strategy—judgmental exhortation—that we are sure 
does not work. In explaining why, we’ll derive some lessons that help 
to identify another—charity and affirmation—that might.  
1. Against Exhortation and Excoriation 
Obviously, exhorting citizens (in their capacities as jurors or as 
interested observers) to be “fair minded” and “nonpartisan” in their 
judgments won’t work. The reason isn’t that citizens won’t take heed 
of such an admonition; it’s that they already are doing just that: self-
defensive cognition generates division among culturally diverse citi-
zens despite their genuine attempts to be even handed in appraising 
the facts of self-defense cases. 
Indeed, we would go further. Moralizing exhortations not only 
aren’t a solution to the problem that self-defensive cognition creates 
in self-defense cases; they are part of the problem. 
In effect, prominent commentators have been aggressively pur-
suing the exhortation strategy for years. Abuse-excuse critics implore 
defenders of the “battered woman defense” and related doctrines to 
cease putting “empathy for some group of disadvantaged defen-
dants” ahead of “neutral principles of law.”135 New Normativists 
answer by demanding that the abuse-excuse critics acknowledge that 
their view of law is not neutral but deeply partisan: invoking the su-
preme value of life to deny only the battered woman a defense while 
permitting cuckolds, true men, and other members of historically ad-
vantaged groups136 to protect their “honor and dignity” through re-
sort to deadly violence “betrays either extreme confusion or hypoc-
risy.”137  
This is a form of debate that both reflects and reinforces the im-
pact of self-defensive cognition and naïve realism on political dis-
 
135 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111, 112. 
136 See Nourse, supra note 36, at 1455. 
137 Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 1, at 333. 
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course. Each side perceives that the other’s factual beliefs and inter-
pretations of law are shaped, either consciously or subconsciously, by 
their commitment to partisan norms, yet don’t recognize—or at least 
don’t recognize fully—that the norms they are committed to have the 
same impact on their own beliefs and views about the law. As a re-
sult, each charges the other with either inability or unwillingness to 
use reason, and each bristles indignantly at the very same accusation 
when made against it. The basic structure of the debate is identical to 
the ones over climate change, gun control, smoking, economic policy 
and countless others in which opposing cultural and ideological fac-
tions mobilize to fight one another not over the content of their val-
ues but over the accuracy of fact perceptions that shaped by their re-
spective values.138 Precisely because these competing views fact are 
so conspicuously aligned with the cultural identities of the citizens 
who hold them, moreover, both sides come to see the outcome as a 
referendum on the competence and status of their own group. And 
that reaction itself ultimately strengthens the self-defensive motiva-
tion of individuals to dismiss any evidence that their own view of the 
facts might be wrong. 
2. For Affirmation and Charity 
We’ve suggested that the self-defensive cognition of self-defense 
is in large part constructed by a deliberative climate that makes resolu-
tion of disputed factual questions a status contest between competing 
culturally and ideologically defined groups. The key to counteracting 
self-defensive cognition, then, is to create a climate that divests resolu-
tion of those factual questions of that public meaning. Without sug-
gesting that it is certain to succeed or to succeed fully, we will de-
scribe a strategy that seeks to achieve that end. 
The foundation for the strategy is a psychological mechanism 
known as identity affirmation. In a series of studies, the psychologist 
Geoffrey Cohen and his collaborators have shown that the effect of 
self-defensive cognition can be neutralized when individuals are first 
exposed to personally affirming experience such as a high test score 
or information on some desirable skill or trait they possess. The 
boost in self-esteem an affirmed person experiences effectively buff-
ers the identity threat that she would otherwise experience when con-
fronted with information that challenges beliefs connected supportive 
 
138 See Kahan, supra note 5. 
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of her values and group commitments. Accordingly, that person 
doesn’t experience the impulse to reject such information. Cohen and 
his associates have shown that identity-affirmation promotes open-
mindedness and potential changes in position on various controver-
sial issues—from the death penalty to abortion to American policy in 
the Middle East—that have in the past been shown to trigger self-
defensive cognition.139 
One potential direct application of identity affirmation would be 
to jury decisionmaking. In a case in which a judge anticipated factual 
disputes of the sort that tend to provoke self-defensive cognition, he 
or she could have jurors engage in one of the self-affirmation exer-
cises shown to be effective in Cohen’s studies.140 Jurors might then 
be expected to give more open-minded consideration to evidence 
that challenges their identity-supportive beliefs and to react with 
greater receptivity to arguments advanced in deliberations by jurors 
of potentially competing cultural persuasions. 
Even if it worked, however, such a procedure would have only a 
limited impact on the problem of the self-defensive cognition of self-
defense. As we have emphasized, the location of that problem is not 
so much the jury room as the virtual town square. Jurors, for what-
ever reason, seem to reach agreement in battered women, belea-
guered commuter and similar cases. It’s the culturally and ideologi-
cally polarized reaction of public to verdicts in those cases that cre-
ates the perception of widespread partisanship, either on the part of 
jurors who decide the cases, members of the public who won’t accept 
the outcomes in particular ones of them, or both. 
Elsewhere, we have described political analogs of identity-
affirmation designed to defuse self-defensive cognition and other 
elements of cognitive illiberalism in political discourse generally.141 
“Expressive overdetermination” is a technique for framing policies 
 
139 See articles cited in note 3, supra. 
140 Jurors, for example, could be instructed to write essays relating “three or four 
personal experiences in which their most highly rated characteristic [as disclosed in 
a previous questionnaire] had made them feel good about them selves.” Cohen, 
Aronson & Steele, supra note 3, at 1153. Perhaps appellate judges, too, should be 
required to engage in such exercises. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Are Judges Political?: An 
Empirical Analysis of the Federal Judiciary (2006) (finding that appellate judges 
sitting in multi-judge panels are prone to polarize on ideological grounds). 
141 See Kahan, supra note 5; Kahan, et al., supra note 58, at 1097-1100. 
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that make them resonate simultaneously with, and thus affirm, a 
range of diverse and competing cultural orientations. The use of trad-
able emissions permits in the Clean Air Act is an example. By show-
ing that air pollution could be solved with a market mechanism—an 
outcome affirming to Individualists—the Act made accepting evi-
dence that industrial emissions damage the environment less threat-
ening to persons of that persuasion. At the same time, its recognition 
of the need to address the environmental damage associated with 
commerce affirmed Egalitarians, making it less threatening for them 
to accept the mounting evidence that “command and control” forms 
of regulation were in fact ineffective. As they converged on a shared 
policy, moreover, the cycle of recrimination associated with naïve 
realism similarly abated, thereby reducing still further the psychic 
pressure on both sides to hold fast to their beliefs as a way to protect 
their identities.142 
We don’t know whether it is possible to implement “expressive 
overdetermination” in the context of self-defense cases, but we can 
think of a related discourse strategy that might have similar effects in 
dissipating conditions of identity threat in this domain. It’s what Cass 
Sunstein calls “political charity”: 
Three practices seem to constitute political charity. First, those who dis-
play political charity do not question the motives of those with whom 
they disagree. On the contrary, they cast those motives in the best possi-
ble light. . . . Second, those who display political charity try to endorse the 
deepest moral commitments of those with whom they disagree. If they 
cannot endorse those commitments, at least they show respect for 
them. . . . Third, those who display political charity try for reforms and 
innovations that can be accepted by people who reject or even abhor 
what they take (fear?) to be the defining commitments of the reformers 
and innovators.143 
What we would propose is that those engaged in public discus-
sion of controversial self-defense cases—in particular, those who, like 
legal commentators, play a highly visible and influential role in 
them—follow these principles. In particular, they should refrain from 
the contemptuous attacks on one another’s motives and intelligence 
that now dominate the Abuse Excuse/New Normativist debate. 
These commentators are in a position to see—we’ve shown them—
 
142 See id. at 1097-98. 
143 Cass Sunstein, Political Charity, The New Republic Open University (Nov. 19, 
2006), http://www.tnr.com/blog/openuniversity?week=2006-11-13. 
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that in fact they are wrong in their interpretations of the source of po-
litical conflict surrounding self-defense cases. It is not the case that 
jurors and judges who afford defenses to battered women, or the citi-
zens who support doing so, are “forsaking objective law” to indulge 
“politically correct” sympathies for “some disadvantaged [group]”;144 
it’s not the case that the Abuse Excuse Critics are “hypocri[tically]” 
indulging their “conservative” ideologies when they exempt from 
their critique defenses for “true men” and enraged cuckolds. Rather, 
commentators on both sides, and more importantly the citizens who 
share their understandings of what the results should be in politically 
controversial cases, are honestly appraising the facts, albeit in a man-
ner shaped by self-defensive cognition. To show respect for one an-
other, commentators on both sides should recognize the good faith of 
their interlocutors, and also acknowledge that any distorting impact self-
defensive cognition exerts on their opponents’ perceptions of the 
facts also operates on their own.  
Most important of all, both sides should stop calling for reforms 
that assault their opponents’ defining commitments. Proposals to 
abolish the “battered woman” defense,145 or to implement one or 
another transparently partisan conception of emotion-based defenses 
in criminal law generally,146 heighten the general sense of status con-
flict that pervades debate about controversial cases, and thus rein-
force the disposition of citizens to form beliefs about those cases that 
support their partisan worldviews. 
There are two reasons why political charity might function as an 
identity-affirmation analog in the public discussions of self-defense 
cases. The first is the critical role that uncharitable discourse plays in 
creating self-defensive cognition. Self-defensive cognition presupposes 
a context: the denial of particular beliefs can threaten a person’s sense 
of self only if some set of social influences have invested those beliefs 
with meanings critical to that person’s identity. The primary social 
 
144 Wilson, supra note 32, at 111, 112. 
145 See id.; Dershowitz, supra note 32  
146 See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in Critical Amer-
ica 63 (S. Bandes ed., 1999); Kelman, supra note 1, at 186-88 (proposing that self-
defense doctrine reflect “error cost” associated with result that denigrates egalitar-
ian values); Sunstein, supra note 47, at 197-98 (“anticaste principle” should guide 
outcomes in cases in which “error costs” include entrenchment of racial or gender 
hierarchy); Lee, supra note 37, at 226-59. 
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influence of this sort in the setting of controversial self-defense cases, 
we believe, is conspicuous and conspicuously recriminatory public 
debate. When a person see others whose values she shares, whose 
credibility she accepts, and whose good opinion she covets denounc-
ing or defending a particular decision, that’s a strong cue that the be-
liefs on which that assessment rest are ones integral to her defining 
commitments. A person is all the more likely to form that impression 
if she can see that those who hold her values are advancing that posi-
tion in response to contrary arguments of persons whose fundamen-
tal values they reject. If those on both sides are attacking the character 
of the other for holding the position they do, then participants will 
naturally perceive that what’s at stake in the debate is the competence 
and status of their defining group. 
A discourse of political charity can reverse these dynamics. To 
begin, it lowers the stakes: when each side acknowledges that the 
other has formed an honest and good faith view of the facts, neither 
has reason to perceive that the debate is judging the character of its 
members. In that climate, moreover, individuals might well approach 
controversial cases with a more open mind. When they see that those 
whose values they share acknowledge that persons of good faith can 
disagree, individuals will feel less anxiety that adopting any particular 
position will estrange them from their peers. Some for that reason will 
likely acknowledge publicly that they have formed factual beliefs dif-
ferent from the ones predominant within their group. And their will-
ingness to do that will itself move other members of their group to 
infer that those beliefs aren’t in fact essential to the identity of persons 
of their cultural or ideological persuasion. 
Obviously, political charity can have these effects only if it is 
practiced. In addition, it would be an obvious mistake to assume that 
political charity will be practiced just because it can be expected to 
have a beneficial impact. For political charity to be regarded as a 
meaningful response to the problem of self-defensive cognition, 
there has to be reason to think a discourse norm of this sort can be 
propagated in an effective way. 
The strategically central position of those whom we are urging 
to propagate it—legal commentators—is the second reason to think 
that political charity might generate an identity-affirmation effect in 
public debate over self-defense cases. Legal commentators play a 
critical role in shaping public understandings of high-profile self-
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defense cases. Indeed, through formulation of the abuse excuse cri-
tique and the New Normative response to it, they have materially 
contributed to the widespread public misperception that such cases 
are being decided in an objectionably partisan way. They are thus in a 
position now to correct that misunderstanding. If commentators, par-
ticularly ones who hold elite credentials, stop accusing decisionmak-
ers, members of the public, and one another of bad faith, and instead 
help members of the public to understand that such cases involve 
honest, good-faith disagreements about the facts, their behavior can 
itself be expected to have a significant impact in dissipating the anxi-
ety that feeds self-defensive cognition. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have pursued three objectives. First, we have 
sought to explain recurring, high-profile political conflict over self-
defense cases. Contrary to the prevailing view among commentators, 
decisionmakers in such cases (and members of the public who react 
to what decisionmakers do) are not willfully overriding their percep-
tion of doctrinally relevant facts to satisfy their partisan values. 
Rather, consistent with the dynamic of self-defensive cognition, they 
are subconsciously relying on their values to determine what the facts 
are. Confronted with factual disputes, individuals are motivated to 
adopt (and to persist in) the beliefs that cohere best with their defin-
ing cultural and ideological commitments, both to avoid a form of 
dissonance and to protect their connection to others who share val-
ues. We presented evidence, in the form of an original empirical 
study, to show that this is exactly what happens when individuals en-
counter prototypically controversial self-defense cases. Indeed, what 
makes such cases controversial consists precisely in interaction of the 
factual claims they present and competing cultural norms. As a result 
of self-defensive cognition in this context, individuals of diverse per-
suasions end up culturally polarized in their judgments of the correct 
outcomes in these cases notwithstanding their honest, good-faith effort 
to decide based on an impartial application of the facts. 
Second, we have offered an appraisal of this phenomenon. The 
impact of self-defensive cognition, we’ve argued, doesn’t imply that 
there isn’t a problem in public reactions to self-defense cases; it sug-
gests only that the problem is different from what it is normally 
thought to be. It is in fact a relief, we agree, to learn that members of 
the public are trying to decide controversial cases impartially and not 
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simply picking outcomes based on their ideological affinity to the de-
fendants and victims. Nevertheless, we think it would be disappointing 
to members of the public were they to learn that the factual percep-
tions they are forming in good faith are nevertheless subconsciously 
influenced by those very affinities. There may be many debates (on 
the effects of gun control, say, or on the acceptability of certain types 
of environmental risks) in which individuals will happily embrace fac-
tual judgments that, in the face of uncertainty, enable them to express 
their conception of the virtuous life and the just society. But in this 
context, we think, the cognitive impact of such values on factual per-
ceptions defeats a commitment that most individuals would have to 
making a basic civic entitlement—the right to protect oneself from 
unjustified violence and to be protected from the same—available 
equally to all citizens regardless of their cultural outlooks and persua-
sions. We view the self-defensive cognition of self-defense as an in-
stance of a distinctive sort of cognitive bias—cognitive illiberalism—
that defeats individuals’ desire to judge fellow citizens in a manner 
respectful of their moral autonomy, and that injects certain identifi-
able pathologies into the politics of a society that aspires to the same. 
Third, we have endeavored to identify at least a partial solution 
to the problem of self-defensive cognition of self-defense. It is the 
practice of political charity—a form of discourse characterized simul-
taneously by respect for one’s adversaries and humility about one’s 
own powers of judgment—among legal commentators.  
In our opinion, the impact of self-defensive cognition in the 
creation of political conflict over self-defense cases is itself at least in 
part an artifact of what legal commentators have been arguing in re-
cent decades. Abuse Excuse Critics and their New Normativists de-
tractors have relentlessly insisted that the positions of their oppo-
nents on cases like those of the battered woman the beleaguered 
commuter are grounded in unacknowledged political partisanship. 
Their arguments contribute to a climate in which individuals form the 
impression that beliefs about the facts in such cases do in fact cohere 
with membership in particular ideologically and culturally defined 
groups. That impression in turn fuels the defensive impulse to form 
and advance beliefs characteristic of one’s group, both to protect 
one’s membership in it and to resist the implicit claim that one and 
one’s peers are dishonest or deluded. 
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Commentators are now in a position to reverse this process. If 
they acknowledge that good-faith disagreements of fact are possible 
here, if they acknowledge that their own perceptions are vulnerable to 
distortion, they can help to mute the cues that induce persons sub-
consciously to equate changing their minds is akin with betraying 
their defining commitments. 
Of course, there’s no guarantee that a discourse of political char-
ity among commentators will work. But in a condition of uncertainty, 
proceeding as if it could would itself express the commitment of such 
individuals to trying to use their special position in public delibera-
tions in a manner that is politically constructive.147 What’s more, be-
cause the best evidence that can now be assembled suggests it simply 
isn’t the case that most members of the public are putting their parti-
san values ahead of their obligation to judge putative instances of vio-
lent self-defense in an impartial way, it would just be wrong, morally, 
for commentators (especially ones who, without the benefit of such 
evidence, have taken a contrary position in the past) to persist in as-
serting otherwise.  
 
147 Cf. Kelman, supra note 1, at 177, 187; Sunstein, supra note 47, at 197. 
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APPENDIX A. STUDY VIGNETTES 
 
Battered Woman 
We’d like to know how you would decide issues raised in a controversial criminal 
trial. We would like to know what you would decide if you were on the jury in 
that trial. First, please read the following summary of the facts and evidence: 
Julie is charged with murdering her husband, William, whom she 
shot in the head as he slept.  
William had persistently abused Julie during their ten-year mar-
riage. This mistreatment included physical beatings, some of which 
resulted in injuries (facial cuts; broken ribs; twice a broken nose) re-
quiring emergency medical treatment. Three times the police arrested 
William for assaulting Julie, but released him from custody each time 
after Julie declined to press charges.  
Testifying in her own defense, Julie told the jury that William 
had beaten her on the morning of the shooting after returning home 
from a night of hard drinking and then fallen asleep in the bedroom. 
Julie testified that she then went to her mother’s nearby home and 
obtained the hand gun used in the shooting. “I felt I had no choice 
except to shoot him,” she stated, “because I knew when he woke up 
this time he was going to hurt me really bad.”  
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, 
a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a 
through psychiatric examination of Julie, Wallace offered his opinion 
that Julie was suffering from “battered woman syndrome.” “Like 
other victims of chronic domestic violence,” Wallace testified, “Julie 
believed that she was powerless to leave and that no one could or 
would help her.” “In my opinion, Julie honestly perceived that her 
husband would attack her if she didn’t kill him first; that belief was 
quite reasonable, given the beatings she had previously suffered, and 
the effect of those beatings on her psyche,” he concluded.  
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Beleaguered Commuter 
We’d like to know how you would decide issues raised in a controversial criminal 
trial. We would like to know what you would decide if you were on the jury in 
that trial. First, please read the following summary of the facts and evidence:  
George is charged with murdering Alvin.  
George (a 48-year old white male; 5' 7", 142 lbs.) fatally shot Al-
vin (a 17-year old African American male; 6' 2", 215 lbs.) after Alvin 
stated "give me some money, man." The shooting occurred on a city 
subway platform at 5:30 p.m. on a weekday evening. After shooting 
Alvin, George fled but turned himself into police three hours later.  
George had been mugged on three previous occasions. On one 
of these, he had been beaten and required fifteen stitches under his 
eye. George had reported the robberies, each of which had been 
committed by persons George described as “teen aged, African 
American males,” but police failed to make any arrests. George 
bought the handgun used in the shooting after the third mugging. 
Testifying in his own defense, George told the jury that, al-
though he’d never seen Alvin before, George “could tell from his 
body language and the aggressive tone of his voice” that Alvin was 
“going to mess with me.” “It was exactly like the other time I had 
been attacked,” George stated. “I felt I had no choice but to shoot 
him,” George said, “because I knew if I didn’t he was going to hurt 
me real bad.” Alvin had a pocket knife on his person, but had not 
displayed it before being shot. 
The defense also called an expert witness: Dr. Leonard Wallace, 
a Ph.D. psychiatrist on the faculty of a major university. Based on a 
through psychiatric examination of George, Wallace offered his opin-
ion that George was suffering from “post-traumatic stress syn-
drome.” “Like many victims of repeated violent beatings,” Wallace 
testified, “George lived in constant fear of additional attacks.” “In my 
opinion, George honestly perceived that Alvin would attack him if he 
didn’t kill him first; that belief was quite reasonable, given the mug-
gings George had previously suffered, and the effect of those mug-
gings on his psyche,” Wallace concluded. 
